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The purpose of the study is to analyze the foreign policy outcomes of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to understand the extent to which a Regional Intergovernmental Organization (RIGO) consisting of developing nations is able to promote regional cooperation. Much of the literature on integration and the formation of Intergovernmental Organizations was developed with regard to western nations. These approaches are examined for their contributions to foreign policy behavior analysis and with respect to understanding why small and developing nations join such organizations.

The case study of the GCC examines foreign policy outcomes in a multi-level and multi-issue framework from 1981-1994. The findings reveal that the domestic level of activity is the most important and that the political issue area is the most significant of the three issue areas. A breakdown by issue area reveals that the economic issues predominate at the domestic and international levels underlining the interdependence of these two levels. Security issues are significant at the domestic level emphasizing the concern over regional threats. The political issue area is significant at the regional level emphasizing the diplomatic abilities of the organization and its ability to create opportunities and legitimize its foreign policy agenda.

Final analysis of the outcomes using two scales to measure the organization's ability to promote regional cooperation reveal that the level of success was moderate and

the level of political action undertaken by the GCC was generally moderate to low. Leadership is supportive of the organization but both external and internal factors contribute to the modest levels achieved so far. Issues of national sovereignty and a decade of regional conflicts affected the ability of the organization to achieve greater levels of regional cooperation.

THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL

1981-1994

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THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL

1981-1994

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DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Purpose and Significance of the Study

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was formally established on 26th May, 1981. Its member states are Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Oman. The 6 countries established this regional organization to advance their security, economic, and political interests. The organization has three political structures: the Supreme Council, which consists of the leaders of the six member nations, The Ministerial Council and the Secretariat General.

The GCC members primary economic resource is oil and these six countries possess 60% of the world's known reserves. In addition to having vast oil reserves, these countries are small in population, militarily weak, and are surrounded by countries that have superior national attributes and capabilities. The 1978 Iranian revolution, and the outbreak of the Iraq-Iran war in 1980, were the precursors for the establishment of the GCC.

Though the GCC is one among many of regional organizations in the Third World, little research has been conducted on the reasons behind their establishment and the effectiveness of such organizations. The vast majority of the literature has been written on integration and the formation of Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs) with regard to western industrialized powers.

Likewise, the theory of regional integration was developed in Western Europe where political, economic and military structures allowed its development. In developing nations it is common to find that a number of these structures are lacking, limiting success when developing nations have tried to implement such an approach.

Little foreign policy research has been conducted on how Regional Intergovernmental Organizations (RIGOs) influence the foreign policy behavior of Third World states. The bulk of the literature on the intergovernmental organizations has been written from a great powers' perspective, ignoring the interests of small and developing nations in joining and establishing these organizations. This study will focus on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a RIGO in the Middle East consisting of small and developing nations.

The study is in line with the scholarly efforts of a growing number of scholars who highlight the need for research on foreign policy outcomes of a RIGO consisting of small states such as the GCC. These writers have argued that analysis should focus more on foreign policy outcomes rather than on inputs or decision making processes, especially with regard to small states (Papadakis and Starr, 1987). As small and weak states, the GCC nations believed membership in a RIGO was the best long term opportunity for economic development and regional stability. Indeed a body of literature posits that one of the reasons for establishing a regional intergovernmental organization is closely linked to the size of nations. (Papadakis and Starr, 1987; Karns and Mingst, 1987; East, 1975).

There are few studies that attempt to examine the GCC as a broad-based issue RIGO involved in implementing a variety of foreign policy issues. Though the GCC has

existed since 1980, much of the literature on the GCC has been written from the superpowers perspective or has focused on single economic or security issues. Research has rarely analyzed the GCC's foreign policy behavior. The literature on the Gulf and the Middle East in general lags behind foreign policy behavior literature at the theoretical level where research and theory building are more advanced. Thus, I believe that a study of the GCC would benefit the general field of foreign policy analysis because it is researching a RIGO consisting of developing nations.

In addition, the research would produce a more balanced and nuanced study of the GCC, over time, which will provide much needed data for Middle East studies and area scholars. I also believe that the research framework used in this study would allow generalizability, which is important in theory building because it allows replication of a study.

At the substantive level, reviewing GCC foreign policy outcomes will allow me to identify the issue areas the GCC confronted and to note the benefits and constraints that affected the GCC as a RIGO attempting regional cooperation to foster stability and continue development. I will also note what level of regional cooperation has occurred and whether this was broadly based or issue specific. Furthermore, I will indicate the extent of regional cooperation and predict the viability of the GCC in the future.

Since the GCC is not confined to a specific issue or interest, this allows us greater options in analyzing its foreign policy outcomes. As explained below in the methodology section, I will measure the foreign policy outcomes by a scale of satisfaction-dissatisfaction and by scaling the diplomatic level of action in an attempt to depict the

political energy expended by members in achieving an outcome. For instance, an outcome such as the ratification of treaties or implementation of sanctions requires member nations to agree to a political outcome. Gaining consensus at this level is generally more difficult than, say a verbal expression of support.

Internal and external factors will also be examined for their effects on the organization's goal of regional cooperation. Finally, I will examine the degree of susceptibility or receptivity of the GCC member countries to this regional organization.

Review of Literature on the GCC

In their book *The Foreign Policy of The Arab States*, Korany and Dessouki note that literature on the Middle East "is of a descriptive or prescriptive genre, rarely linked to recent conceptualization in foreign policy analysis," (Korany and Dessouki 1991, 1).

In this regard, we find that several studies offer a historical account of the GCC or its member nations. Pridham (1985), Zahlan (1989), and J.B. Kelly (1980), are examples of writers who explain the history and evolution of the states and the region and their importance to western nations. These works also emphasize the area's relevance to the west.

A second category of writing on the Gulf states and the GCC focuses on the military dimension and the security and stability of the region. The emphasis is on the security of the Gulf as it affects the foreign policy of western nations, particularly the United States. Looney (1990), and Cordesman (1984) provide examples of this type. Cordesman (1984), J.E. Peterson (1986) and others discuss regional stability and the

possibilities of deploying western forces in the region. They highlight the area's peculiar security issues of the 1980s and the limitations with respect to western involvement in the region.

Much of this literature arose because the Iranian revolution focused attention on the Gulf states and their oil industries, vital interests to the western nations. The decade long Iran-Iraq war also sparked interest in the Gulf because of the threat to oil exports and a result was an increase in literature concerned with military and economic security issues.

This literature, on the security of the Gulf region, is one of the largest categories of writing, especially during and after the Kuwait conflict, and helps us to understand how the region was perceived by western foreign policy analysts. Indeed between 1985 and 1993 there were about 20 pieces on economic perspectives and about 15 on security issues with summaries on the GCC totalling about 10.

The third group of writers focuses on economic and socio-cultural factors, especially case studies of particular countries. Examples are Lawson's (1989) study of Bahrain, Crystal's (1992) study of Kuwait, and Zahlan's (1989) on the UAE. Their perspective of case studies have more of a focus on emerging nations. In the late 1980s the emphasis was on domestic economic issues, especially the oil industry and the emerging banking services industry in the Gulf: (Angell, Askari and Dastmaltzchi, El-Kuwaiz, Henderson, in Sandwick (ed) 1987, Looney 1990, Gause 1994). These works studied the GCC with optimism for its professed ideals of domestic and regional security and economic stability. These writers were also interested in the GCC because it was modeled on the European Community (EC).

Following Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the subsequent retrenchment of the original status quo by the Gulf rulers many writers wondered whether the states would realize the importance of more democratic strategies, such as popular representation via national councils and elections. The liberation of eastern Europe, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and Kuwait's brief demise, generated several studies such as Green (1993), and Crystal (1994) that stressed the need for power sharing for the local populations similar to that in operation in the 1970s in Kuwait and Bahrain.

The vast majority of the above works dealt with the Gulf states and Gulf security and economic issues. With regard to the specific literature on the GCC we note that this body of literature began to appear in the mid 1980s. It offered an historical analysis of the GCC as a RIGO succeeding in a region of turmoil. Much of this work however, is descriptive, focusing on the GCC's structure and its major foreign policy issues. (See Ramazani (1987), Nakhleh (1987), Christie (1987), Anthony (1984) et al.). Studies by Ramazani (1987) and E. Peterson (1988) have attempted a foreign policy behavior framework and examined regional cooperation and integration by the GCC. Still, other analyses focused on particular aspects of security, economic development, and organizational structures such as (Sandwick ed. (1987), J.E. Peterson (1987, 1986). Few scholarly articles on the GCC are theoretically based, but rather are historical and descriptive.

In sum, the literature on the Gulf nations is primarily historical case studies. Political structures are viewed from the leader perspective with the idea of ruling families operating in a traditional hierarchical authoritarian manner within a tribal society setting.

Economic and security structures are generally viewed from a great powers perspective or reductionist model approach. (Korany and Dessouki, 1991). Moreover, current research does not incorporate international organization or regional integration approaches. The interest is mainly on the regional effects of the GCC and its utility to western powers.

A Study of Regional Integration Theory

There are two main approaches to political integration. The first argues that political systems gain and retain cohesiveness because of widely shared values among their members and general agreement about the framework of the system. It is based on procedural consensus, or agreement about the political framework and the legal processes by which issues are resolved, and the substantive consensus. The greater the procedural and substantive consensus the greater the integration of the political system (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff 1990, 431).

The second approach holds that political systems become or remain cohesive because of the presence, or threat, of force (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff 1990, 431). For the establishment of the GCC both ideas seem to hold true. The stated reason for the organization's development was economic, but the primary reason was regional threats; more specifically an expansion of the Iranian revolution.

In addition to explaining the reasons behind integration, the existing literature offers a plethora of definitions. Regional integration is defined in many ways and has been viewed as a process, an outcome, and a fusion of both. This divergence arose from "the

indefinite nature of the end state...to which regional integration is supposed to lead," (Haas 1970, 622).

Integration is defined here as any level of association between actors, on one dimension or another (Keohane and Nye 1975, 364-365). Such a definition allows scholars "to speak not only of various types of integration such as economic, social and political integration, but of various levels as well," (Keohane and Nye 1975, 365).

Haas also viewed integration as "a process for the creation of political communities defined in institutional and attitudinal terms, a condition also described by Jacob and Teune," (Haas 1970, 611). Haas also noted that "The study of regional integration is concerned with the outcomes or consequences of such activities in terms of a 'new deal' for the region in question..." (Haas 1970, 611).

Haas became "one of the best known theorists of regional integration..." and his "conceptual approach to the study of political integration soon acquired the label neofunctionalism..." (Viotti and Kauppi 1987, 207). Haas's work differed from earlier writers on integration such as Mitrany's in "his rejection of the notion that one could separate technical tasks from politics or welfare from power," (Viotti and Kauppi 1987, 207).

Mitrany thought that "successful collaboration in one particular technical field or functional area would lead to further collaboration in other related fields," (Viotti and Kauppi 1987, 206). This became known as functionalism and was popular in post-war Western Europe because of the establishment of the forerunner to the European Community.

Still, another group of scholars highlighted the role of communication on integration. In this connection, Karl Deutsch who is generally associated with communications theory, 'pioneered' the cybernetic approach to integration processes by focusing on the "transactions among societies and on changes in public attitudes within societies," (Keohane and Nye in Viotti and Kauppi 1993, 386). Deutsch is credited with defining integration as "turning 'previously separate units into components of a coherent system,'" (Keohane and Nye in Viotti and Kauppi 1993, 387).

In brief, integration literature has made four significant contributions to international relations theory. According to Viotti the four contributions are: First, "the literature of regional integration downplays the state as the unit of analysis....," Second, "the neofunctionalist literature... has disaggregated the nation-state, examining such component parts as bureaucracies and elites.," Third, it has also posed "the question of what other forms of political organization - aside from the territorially based nation-state - are possible," and finally, "integration theorists have analyzed the conditions under which international cooperation is facilitated," (Viotti and Kauppi 1987, 209).

A natural expansion of these theoretical contributions alludes to the general possibilities the integration theoretical framework contains for the study of RIGOs.

International Organization Theory and IGOs

The writings on integration provided the foundation for a new body of literature on role, structure and influence of international governmental organizations (IGOs). IGOs are classified as a type of institution. There are problems in adequately defining an

institution, but following Keohane's lead an institution is a "persistent and connected set of rules (formal and informal) that prescribe behavioral roles, constrain activity, and shape expectations," (Keohane 1989, 3). From this Keohane classifies three types of international institutions; formal intergovernmental, or cross-national non-governmental organizations; international regimes; and conventions. (Keohane 1989, 3).

Of interest to the study are the formal intergovernmental organizations. These are "a formal, continuous structure established by agreement between members (governmental and or non-governmental) from two or more sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the common interest of the membership," (Archer 1992, 37). IGOs are structures that straddle both the domestic and international arenas. And as such are "an integral part of a system characterized by complex interdependence," (Karns and Mingst 1987, 457).

Karns and Mingst maintain that, "IGOs provide the formal institutional components of 'international regimes' by which states seek to provide order and reduce uncertainty," (Karns and Mingst 1987, 457). If, as current research indicates, states are relying more frequently on IGOs, particularly regional IGOs (RIGOs) to solve problems, and gain benefits for members, then there is a greater need to understand them. In a state-centric research agenda IGOs are seen as part of the international arena. They are seen to supersede states, although their membership consists of sovereign states.

An IGO is therefore a relevant entity in the international system and can "provide opportunities for national decision-making at the same time that they add to the constraints under which states must operate," (Karns and Mingst 1987, 457).

As Karns and Mingst note “some organizations linked to some issue areas have more impact than others; certain states are more susceptible or receptive to IGO influences than others,” (Karns and Mingst 1987, 455). IGOs are “both the creation of states and the tools of statecraft, available to states as part of their ‘menu of choices’ (Russett and Starr, 1985)” in (Karns and Mingst 1987, 467).

Region is defined in geographic terms (Russett 1967) so that nations in a specific area of the world are grouped in an understandable way. Implicit in the term region are certain common characteristics that are shared by these nations. In the case of the GCC topographical features, socio-cultural and political characteristics are very similar. For example, the member nations experience a harsh desert climate and geography, share the religion of Islam and the Gulf Arabic language, and are ruled by similar traditional and monarchic political systems. Therefore the GCC consists of member nations that share “a common religion, comparable social structure,... economic development, similar systems of government and a shared geography,” (Christie 1987, 7).

IGOs have the ability to increase opportunities or constraints and thus affect a member state’s behavior. Research on IGOs has generally focused on organizational structures, internal decision-making processes, or specific issue areas. Little has been done to understand IGO outcomes with regards to foreign policy behavior of an organization.

IGOs can be categorized by membership, purpose or aim, and structure. Membership can be regional or universal. The purpose of an IGO can be general or specific and the structure describes the internal framework. IGOs also contribute widely to international affairs.

“Not only do they provide a means for expressing the individual and collective wills of states, they also act independently to profoundly influence interstate relations by promoting socioeconomic interdependence and contributing to the management and resolution of international conflict,” (Amstutz 1995, 39).

Amstutz states that general purpose IGOs are the most important, “They are more directly involved in transnational political issues than the more narrowly-oriented organizations,” (Amstutz 1995, 39).

Pentland examined international organizations by their roles and said, “three of the roles most widely attributed to international organizations are: 1) instruments of national policy, 2) systematic modifiers of states’ behavior, and 3) autonomous international actors,” (Pentland 1976, 5).

The interpenetration between IGOs and their member states is apparent in foreign policy behavior. “As instruments for the collective pursuit of foreign policy goals, international organizations are subject to evaluation by member states in terms of their utility,” (Pentland 1976, 6). His discussion centered on the actions of small states. In the late 1970s the concept of hegemonic states was important to international organization studies because these states were assumed to exist and play a role particularly in regional organizations.

“In regional organizations especially, a hegemonic state can usually be assured of sufficient small power backing to permit it to manage the organization toward acceptable decisions,” (Pentland 1976, 6). This largely depends on the structure of the organization and also the influence of particular member states. The structure is also relevant to an IGO acting as a systematic modifier of state behavior (Pentland 1976, 10). Pentland also noted

that IGOs “sometimes achieve a degree of autonomy and influence as political actors in their own right,” and also noted that “International Organizations may have divergent expectations as to their future development,” (Pentland 1976, 14).

In the second half of the 1980s, the research on IGOs was said to be in a state of flux. Kratochwil and Ruggie describe four major foci in the field. The first focus was the study of formal institutions which led to a second focus, “the actual decision-making processes within the international organizations.” The third was “the actual and potential roles of international organizations in a more broadly conceived process of international governance.” The fourth focus was international regimes. (Kratochwil and Ruggie 1986, 755-759).

The interest in international regimes and the difficulty of conceptualizing made many scholars question the direction of IO studies in the 1980s. Few articles have been published on IGOs or international organizations in the past ten years. But far from being pessimistic about the problems of the late 1980s it is apparent in the mid 1990s that interest in regional integration and cooperation and non-state actors has increased. Writings on the subject are more prevalent in western Europe (Fawcett and Hurrell 1995). This can be attributed to the break up of the Soviet Union and eastern Europe and discussions on the future role of IGOs and regional IGOs in the international political structure.

States, especially small states, are said to have a predisposition to join IGO's. They make use of these organizations as a way to gain power or to have a voice in the international arena on specific issues such as economic or military matters or on a broad

range of issues. In chapter two there is further discussion on the reasons that small states join IGOs. This approach has direct bearing on the member nations of the GCC.

Methods and Analysis

Dependent Variable

In this study the dependent variables are the foreign policy outcomes for events between 1981-1994. Foreign policy outcome is defined as a “product... imposed upon the environment external to the decision unit,” (Robinson and Majak 1967, 185). Gallhofer and Saris note “The dependent variables, the foreign policy actions or events, which are the outputs or decisions, are classified according to situational characteristics such as..., the level of conflict or cooperation, and so forth,” (1996, 188).

To gain more concise results on the ability of the GCC to achieve regional cooperation, the outcomes were also categorized by “level of success,” and also “level of diplomatic acts.” This is in keeping with Azar et al's discussion on the benefits of scaling and/or categorizing outcomes.

The scale of satisfaction or success with the outcome will help us to determine if the GCC provided a forum for regional cooperation. The outcome satisfaction categories are an evaluation of the outcomes from the viewpoint of the GCC. Event outcomes were coded:

- 0 - satisfied, success, support outcome
- 1 - neutral, further study or continuing study outcomes
- 2 - not satisfied, no success, conflict over outcome.

This categorization of foreign policy outcomes was used in an attempt to depict the outcomes success rate by level and issue area. (adapted from Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1990, 39).

Decision rules on coding the satisfaction categories were as follows; as the daily event outcomes were coded the statements, communiques, speeches, interviews, discussion of meetings and maneuvers, agreements, resolutions and treaties were analyzed in the success category for the following key words:

success, happy with results, support, fully support, endorse, unanimously agree (or condemn), GCC supports (condemns), praises.

In the neutral category the key words were:

further study, further attention, continue study or mediation, will study, will work, will continue.

In the not satisfied category the key words were:

no success achieved or gained, conflict, disagreement, unhappy with result, not satisfied, call for unity, decision not to attend, postpone or cancellation because of noted disharmony.

The second scale used to characterize the GCC's foreign policy outcomes is Level of diplomatic acts. This is an attempt to depict the political energy expended by members in achieving an outcome. Typically talk is cheap and outcomes such as the ratification of treaties or implementation of sanctions require member nations to agree to a political outcome with more at stake. Gaining consensus at this level is generally more difficult

than, say a verbal expression of support. Four categories were utilized with the lowest diplomatic acts being:

0 - verbal statements

1 - talks and meetings

2 - treaties and agreements

3 - aid, assistance, or sanctions.

The verbal statements category includes verbal expressions of support of condemnation and events such as press conferences, radio and television interviews, and speeches. The talks and meetings category includes mediation, maneuvers, procedural acts, and any outcomes that involved discussions.

Treaties and agreements category includes any outcomes where treaties, agreements, resolutions or memoranda were adopted, announced, ratified, or partially or fully implemented. In the final category aid, assistance or sanctions includes any outcome that involved economic or political sanctions, and economic or military aid or assistance.

I contend that this latter category is the highest level of diplomatic action by the GCC because more is at stake in a foreign policy outcome by the GCC as an organization when aid, assistance or sanctions are expressed. The scale was achieved by reviewing the event outcomes on the above criteria whilst coding.

Independent Variables

The independent variables relate to the issue areas. In this study three issue area categories are used. The issue areas are economic, security, and political. There are

several reasons for the use of these categories. First, economic development is paramount to developing nations. Sullivan (1976,135) noted “economic development and size appear to be the strongest influences across most types of foreign policy.” East (1975) found that “a substantial proportion of small-state foreign policies are concerned with economic issues,” (Papadakis and Starr 1987, 428).

Second, security is an important issue area category not only for developing nations but also any nation or organization that wishes to continue as a viable entity in the international system. Finally, political issues relate directly to an organization's and member states sovereignty and capacity to act. Political issues generally involve diplomatic recourse and recognition.

In this study the economic issue area will consist of events including discussions on, or agreements pertaining to: economic aid and development; oil, gas and petrochemicals; manufacturing and metal industries; finance and banking; shipping and transport; agriculture and fishing; labor; and telecommunications. In other words the “economic-developmental issue area comprises all those issues which involve the acquisition and allocation of resources, such as trade, aid and foreign investment,” (Gallhofer and Saris 1996, 178).

Events coded under the security issue area will include discussions on, or agreements pertaining to: military expenditures; domestic, regional, or international security issues; coups or attempted coups; riots and/or internal unrest; invasion/occupation; war; and border disputes. Thus “Security-military comprises all issues which focus on questions pertaining to violence, including... weaponry, and those

which are perceived by the foreign policy elite as constituting a security threat,” (Gallhofer and Saris 1996, 178).

Finally, events coded under the political issue area will include discussions on, and agreements pertaining to: diplomatic relations; domestic, regional or international talks; treaties; cultural and social issues; and regional and international organizations. As Gallhofer and Saris note, “The political-diplomatic issue area covers the spectrum of foreign policy interaction to each of the three levels of the external environment - ...” (1996, 179). In the case of the GCC as these nations are authoritarian, monarchical regimes that lack popular voting, free press, political parties and democratically elected national councils the political indicators used are those that encompass issues that are not military or economic issues. All three issue areas are those that the three institutional levels of the GCC may be involved with at any given time.

The events in any of these issue areas can occur at the domestic, regional, or international levels. The domestic level consists of the GCC member states of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman. Thus issues relating to a member state or its national policy are important at this level. The regional level consists of countries in the Middle East and this area stretches from the north African states in the west to Iran in the east. It also encompasses regional organizations such as the Arab League. The International level consists of nations and organizations in the rest of the world with primary importance given to superpowers and trading partners, such as the United States of America, the United Kingdom (UK), the European Community (EC), France, the United Nations (UN), and Japan.

Event Data Analysis

The study makes use of event data analysis procedures to code the economic, political, and security issue area outcomes for the GCC from 1981 to 1994 using the Foreign Broadcast Information Service-Near East and South Asia (FBIS) Daily Reports. The event data analysis procedures will allow a determination of the GCC's distribution of its efforts among issue areas, whether domestic, regional, or international issues predominated, and whether any patterns or trends in these issue types developed.

Event data analysis is the procedure used to gather and evaluate actions between political actors. Event data analysis implies that "the basic units of analysis are the individual events created by polity action," (McClelland 1972, 28). "The concept of an event as a unit for gathering, organizing, and analyzing behavior is hardly new," (Hermann et al. 1972, 5). As Azar et al. note international events are the "overt behavior of national or international political actors toward each other or their environments," (Azar et al. 1972, 61). Burgess and Lawton observe that, "Events data is the term that has been coined to refer to words and deeds - i.e., verbal and physical actions and reactions - that international actors... direct toward their domestic or external environments," (1972, 6).

Azar, et al. note that "In organizing events data for the purpose of quantitative analysis there are two major research strategies: 1) the categorization strategy attempts to classify events into types of events; and 2) the scaling of the content of events strategy measures events along some dimension of violence, conflict, cooperation, and so on," (Azar et al. 1972, 61). Both strategies will be used in this research.

For my purposes, then, the operational definition of an event is: "Any overt input or output of the type 'who does what to or with whom and when' which may have ramifications for the behavior of an international actor or actors and which is recorded at least once in any publicly available source..." (Azar et al. 1972, 62). Events are said to be of two types: discrete and continuous. The latter is an event that persists over a period of time while a discrete event is a one time occurrence.

For the purposes of this study, the continuous events were disaggregated into separate events. This was done to ensure that the ongoing issues fit the definition of an event. As will be shown below in the decision rules, the disaggregation of continuous events such as a Supreme Council meeting enables me to record the multiple topics examined as separate events.

The components of an event are said to be; actor, target, activity, issue-area, and time. An actor can be "a nation-state, ... a regional organization, or an international organization," (Azar et al. 1972, 62). Actor will generally be taken here to mean the GCC as a RIGO. (Further clarification is available in the section "Methodology and Decision Rules.") A target is "a political entity to which an activity is directed," (Azar et al. 1972, 62). In this case the data has difficulty in adequately specifying a particular nation or organization because of its nature. As Leng states, "the determination of the target of comments, requests, and intentions presents complications," (1987, 28). For example, Leng had to use a special code indicating a public statement addressed to the world at large in the Behavioral Correlates Of War (BCOW) study, (1987, 28).

Therefore, taking the BCOW study's lead, the decision rule on coding an event's target is by region so that outcomes expressed toward the domestic level are coded 4100, those expressed toward the regional level as a target are coded 4200, and those expressed toward the international level as a target are coded 4300. In cases where it was possible to discern a national or organizational target the entity was coded by its regional level and then coded more specifically in the "additional party" category.

The activity is "actions, reactions or interactions which are precipitated by clearly identified actor(s) or directed toward clearly identified target(s)," (Azar et al. 1972, 62). Examples include signing treaties, economic aid, military assistance, or mediation. This is linked to issue area which is a category "identifying an important component of an event other than actor, target, activity, or time. It defines the parameters of the event by elaborating the intensity, arena, intermediate participants, or topic of the event," (Azar et al. 1972, 62). In this case, issue-area will be used to mean the topic of the event, i.e. whether it is economic, political or security related.

And time is "the day on which the source reports the event." (Azar et al. 1972, 62). Events in the study are coded by date on which they were reported to have occurred and also on the date on which they were reported in the source. For the outcome analysis only the "actual date of the event is valid," and, "In rare cases where the day of the event is not reported,..." it is assumed the event outcome occurred on the date of the source report and is coded as such (Azar 1982, 3).

"In cases where one event stretches over several days and is reported daily only the date of initiation of the talks or visit, etc. is coded unless statements or communiques are

issued at the termination of the event.” (Azar 1982, 3). In the case of GCC meetings statements were issued during meetings, on the first day and more generally on the final day. Therefore I coded the date of the event as the day on which statements or communiques were issued.

Data Requirements, Methodology and Decision Rules

Data used in the study are sources reported in the FBIS-Near East and South Asia daily reports on the GCC for 1981-1994 in the following categories:

- a. GCC charters and agreements
- b. official resolutions and agreements
- c. notification of meetings or maneuvers
- d. statements or communiques on meetings or maneuvers
- e. speeches or interviews by an official representative of the GCC
- f. speeches or interviews by the designated head of the GCC for that year or by the upcoming head of the GCC for the next summit conference
- g. mass media reports on the GCC in English
- h. mass media reports on the GCC by Arab press that were deemed ‘reliable’ sources, i.e. non-rhetorical or propagandistic.

The coded events are for the three issue areas that the GCC's institutions dealt with during the years 1981-1994 at the Supreme Council, Ministerial and the Secretariat General level.

From the 1174 reports on the GCC in FBIS-Near East and South Asia, 1372 events were coded for a span of 14 years. The decision rules used to determine a codeable event were:

1. the GCC initiates the event outcome
2. the GCC and another nation or organization jointly initiate an event outcome
3. another nation or organization initiates the event but it specifically references the GCC and an outcome they have produced.
4. a GCC nation is event coded if that nation is the nominal head of the GCC or that particular year
5. a GCC nation is event coded if that nation will become the nominal head of the GCC at the next summit conference.

Once the data were coded they permit the analysis of what types of issues occurred, at what level they occurred, and their relative frequency. Tables and graphs will permit the detection of any trends or patterns and indicate at which level these occur.

Hypotheses

From the discussion above it is possible to formulate hypotheses for the study. It is suggested that:

H1: The GCC will be more active in economic issue area outcomes at the domestic or international level.

This is because GCC trade is dependent on the international arena and trading partners such as the European Community (EC), United States of America (USA) and Japan.

H2: The GCC, in its concern for stability, will be more active in security issue area outcomes at the domestic and regional levels.

This hypothesis is understandable when the volatility of the region and the environment of the GCC are considered. Between 1981 and 1994 the organization witnessed regional conflict with the Iranian revolution, the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, and the invasion of Kuwait. External threats would no doubt be taken seriously by the GCC because of the threat of spillover into their nations.

Finally, because of the nature of the GCC, a RIGO consisting of small nations, and its position in the Middle East, it is expected that:

H3: GCC diplomatic foreign policy outcomes will be more prevalent at the regional level.

This is anticipated because the GCC wishes to maintain stability in the region so that it can continue its economic development and provide security for its people. The GCC is therefore expected to be a willing participant in regional politics thus promoting cooperation and unity so that regional problems can be solved and the status quo maintained.

The study tries to explain the role of small nations in the membership of a RIGO and the place of such an organization in promoting regional cooperation. This has political implications for the present and future because of the increased presence of such organizations at the international level. Thus how well such an organization promotes regional cooperation by level or issue area is a significant answer that may explain foreign policy behavior of a non-state actor.

Other questions that are pertinent are the following: whether internal or external factors are a consideration in particular outcomes, and which receive more important political action. Also are these outcomes a result of the situational context (the environment) or is it possible to assert that the GCC attempted to maintain stability and thus promote regional cooperation wherever possible?

In chapter 2 an explanation of why small states join IGOs is introduced with relevance to the GCC nations and the history and structure of the GCC is described.

Chapter 3 discusses the results of the economic issue area outcomes, chapter 4 the results of the security outcomes, and chapter 5 the political outcomes. Chapter 6 concludes the study and offers explanations for GCC foreign policy behavior and the significance of the study with regard to regional cooperation and the foreign policy behavior of IGOs and RIGOs and also notes possible directions for future research.

CHAPTER 2

IGOS AND SMALL STATES

This chapter discusses the reasons why small states join IGOs and RIGOS. A discussion of the formation and historical background of the GCC and its structure and institutions follows.

States, especially small states, are said to be predisposed to joining IGO's. They make use of these organizations as a way to gain power, to have a voice in the international arena on economic or security matters or a wide range of issues. Indeed, summarizing the literature on the foreign policy behavior of small states East found a "model" of behavior. He noted small states were expected to show various traits: low levels of overall participation in world affairs, high levels of activity in intergovernmental organizations, high levels of support for international legal norms, avoidance of the use of force as a technique of statecraft, avoidance of behavior which tends to alienate the more powerful states in the system, and a narrow functional and geographic range of concern in foreign policy activities. (1975, 160. in Papadakis and Starr, 1987). Papadakis and Starr note that this reinforces the view that small states are in an "inactive (but reactive) submissive state in international affairs. Small states do not challenge the status quo - are in fact supportive of it - and try to cultivate the goodwill of the larger powers," (1987, 429).

This view is one that existed within the realist perspective where power was the important factor for all nations. It is also a view that Korany and Dessouki decry because it posits the idea that foreign policy is decided by “the same processes and decision calculi that shape the foreign policies of developed countries.” (1991, 9). They argue that, in comparison to large states, small states have “fewer resources and capabilities and therefore conduct foreign policy on a smaller scale,” (1991, 9). States are not all “motivated by security factors” and in fact “specific features of the developing countries such as modernization, the low level of political institutionalization at home, and dependency status in the global stratification system abroad,” are overlooked. (Korany and Dessouki, 1991, 9).

Having noted this, the points that East (1975, 160) raise have relevance to the GCC as the members’ leadership established the organization with the intent of pursuing stability through regional cooperation.

The environment of small states provides them with a particular set of opportunities and constraints. (Papadakis and Starr 1987, 420). Smallness reduces the resources available for national and foreign policy because small states have a limited population, a small domestic economy and a high degree of dependence on foreign trade (Papadakis and Starr 1987, 425). Conversely, small states are said to be able to “appeal to world opinion,... focus attention on specific local issues and mobilize the resources and will to back policy,... and exert influence.. on larger states by appealing to mutual interests,” (Papadakis and Starr 1987, 426).

Various factors are used to determine whether a nation is 'small.' Small and weak are generally linked because a nation's power is, or was, related to its national resources or 'capabilities.' As Duval and Thompson (1980) warn, and Korany notes, "social scientists realized at last that size as a variable suffered from a case of overdetermination, from a monovariate approach to explanation." (Korany 1986, 5). Size should therefore be considered a multifaceted variable with topographical, military, economic, and diplomatic resources placed under this heading. It can be argued that the GCC states are all small states under these criteria. They have a harsh desert climate, limited land area, limited economic resources with a reliance on a single industry, limited social, and political resources, and a lack of military capabilities.

However, there is still confusion over small states in the global system with regards to their foreign policy behavior, because as Papadakis and Starr conclude "it does not seem that the major assumptions about small states are valid in the contemporary international system," (Papadakis and Starr 1987, 430).

Consequently states will seek out an organization or establish one that will promote their interests and needs. Karns and Mingst note that states may join IGOs for the following reasons:

1. Interest aggregation, collective influence and bargaining,
2. Use as a vehicle for security and collective legitimization of their own foreign policy actions and delegitimize others foreign policy actions,
3. Use an IGO to create international public policy and for influencing other states policies,

4. Provide different frameworks for multilateral cooperation in different issue areas, for enhancing opportunities for different states to exercise influence in different issue areas and organizations,
5. and an IGO may provide opportunities for bilateral and multilateral discussion. (Karns and Mingst 1987, 468-469).

The GCC may be described as a broad based RIGO because its interests encompass economic, security, and political matters. Karns and Mingst note that “predisposition and receptivity to IGOs are not only a matter of general attitude toward external influence and multilateralism, but a function of the issue area and purposes of the IGO itself,” (Karns and Mingst 1987, 469). They go on to note that states are said to “seek out the most favorable forum,” (Karns and Mingst 1987, 469), and the GCC, as a regional organization of ‘small’ states, tries to gain benefits for its members by institutionalizing its demands and needs at the domestic, regional, and international levels.

Domestic Factors

As Christie notes domestic similarities were an advantage in establishing the organization. The GCC was fortunate because all the member nations share “a common religion, comparable social structure,... economic development, similar systems of government and a shared geography,” (Christie 1987, 7).

Topographical Features

Topographical concerns involve the geographic and strategic position of the nations, land area, natural resources and climate. In this instance all six nations border the western side of the Persian Gulf and also, in the case of Oman, the Indian ocean, and Saudi Arabia, the Red Sea. Therefore all have access to the sea with at least three ports (World Factbook 1995).

The GCC nations are generally flat desert plains rising to low escarpments or dunes in the case of Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE, with Saudi Arabia and Oman also having high mountains. Very little land is arable. What agriculture there is exists at the subsistence farming level and is heavily subsidized by the national governments. Saudi Arabia is the only nation of the GCC that has an agricultural sector that approaches self-sufficiency for the nation. It accounts for about 10% of the GDP. One real problem all the member nations experience is a severe depletion of ground water reserves. This has meant an increasing reliance on sea water and the use of desalination plants for all water needs (World Factbook 1995).

The climate is one of cool short winters and very hot summers, with high humidity experienced in Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and to a lesser extent in the other nations. Dust storms, drought or severe rainstorms can be severe, resulting in a harsh arid desert climate.

The land area of the nations ranges from 620 square kilometers (sq. km.) for Bahrain, about three times the size of Washington D.C.; Qatar 11,000 sq. km., about the size of Connecticut; Kuwait 17,820 sp. km., similar in size to New Jersey; the UAE 75,581 sq. km., similar in size to Maine; Oman is 212,460 sq. km., similar in size to

Kansas; and Saudi Arabia is 1,960,582 sq. km. approximately one quarter the size of the USA in land area (World Factbook 1995).

Economic Resources

One geological feature that has been a benefit to the GCC nations is that the region is rich in petroleum and natural gas reserves. These nations have about 40% of the world's oil reserves, and with the exception of Bahrain, enough oil for the next 20 years at current production rates. The GCC member nations have found themselves, because of dependence on a single economic resource, in an important geostrategic position bordering oil shipping lanes that serve most of the western industrialized nations.

Indeed a depiction of the main import and export partners of the GCC nations in Table 2.1 and 2.2 shows a noticeable dependence on international trading partners rather than regional ones. This is because the major exports are crude oil, refined oil products, petrochemicals, and to a lesser extent aluminium, steel, copper, fertilizers, textiles, fish and dates. Major imports include foodstuffs and livestock; building materials; vehicles, transport equipment, machinery and spare parts; clothing and textiles; chemicals and lubricants; and consumer and manufactured goods (World Factbook 1995).

The social infrastructure of the member states are geared toward international exports by sea with road links to the ports and airports, but more of the road systems are now joining larger villages and towns in all areas of the nations. Communications also vary, with Bahrain having the most sophisticated telecommunications system. This has

greatly benefited their attempts to diversify their economy, enabling them to become a major services and offshore banking center.

Table 2.1

Export Partners of GCC Nations

Americas	Europe	Asia	GCC
USA	France	Japan	UAE
Brazil	Italy	Singapore	Saudi Arabia
	UK	South Korea	Oman
			India
			Iran
			China

(World Factbook 1995)

Table 2.2

Import Partners of GCC Nations

Americas	Europe	Asia	GCC
USA	UK	Japan	Saudi Arabia
Canada	Germany	South Korea	UAE
	France		
	Italy		

Sociocultural Factors

One important factor that greatly affects the economy of the GCC nations is national population. A large percentage of the labor forces are expatriates employed in certain highly skilled service and oil industry sectors or expatriates primarily from Asia employed as servants or in the construction and maintenance sectors working the menial jobs.

The population of the GCC nations ranges from 533,916 for Qatar, 575,925 for Bahrain, 1.817 million for Kuwait, 2.13 million for Oman, 2.92 million for the UAE, to 18.73 million for Saudi Arabia. In Kuwait and the UAE some 70-80% of the labor force is foreign, Bahrain is estimated at 42%, Oman's is a smaller amount but Saudi Arabia estimates 4.6 million of the 5-6 million labor force are foreign workers. The governments acknowledge training and acquisition of technical skills by their nationals is a priority but many of the educated would rather be employed in service-sector jobs at managerial levels (World Factbook 1995).

The majority of the national populations are between 15 and 64 years. By estimated 1995 figures about 68% of Qatar's population was in this category, 67% of Bahrain's, 64% of Kuwait's and the UAE's, 55% of Saudi Arabia's and 51% of Oman's. Literacy rates ranged from 62% in Saudi Arabia to 84% in Bahrain. (World Factbook 1995). The common religion for all GCC nations is Islam. In Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the UAE the Sunni muslims are the majority whereas in Bahrain the Shia'a muslims are the majority and the Ibadhi in Oman.

The common language is Arabic with the Gulf dialect although English, Hindi, and Urdu are widely spoken. Also important is a nation's defense capabilities. All the GCC nations suffer from limited military resources because their small national populations means limited manpower and military operations capabilities even though military expenditures can be a large portion of national GDP. The following table depicts the GCC nations' military resources.

Table 2.3

Military Capabilities

	Males fit for military duty	Reach military age annually	Spending \$	%GDP
Qatar	115,103	3,195 (18)	NA	NA
Bahrain	17,414	4,346 (15)	247m	5.5% ('94)
Oman	294,993	26,065 (14)	1.7b	14.2% ('95)
Kuwait	363,735	16,170 (18)	3.4b	13.3% ('95)
UAE	583,993	19,266 (18)	1.59b	4.3% ('94)
Saudi Arabia	2.95m	164,220 (17)	17.2b	13.8% ('94)

(World Factbook 1995)

Political Resources

The final national resource is the political structure of the member nations. Again similarities prevail with all six nations governing along traditional monarchical and authoritarian lines. The ruler and the deputy, generally the prime minister, are members of the ruling family with a cabinet or council of ministers appointed by the ruler. With the exception of Kuwait there is no suffrage. In Kuwait voting takes place for members of the National Assembly only. None of the GCC nations allow political parties and thus the political structure is one of traditional leadership.

In conclusion, the topographical, economic, sociocultural factors of the GCC nations influence the 'size' of these nations. Because of climatic conditions and populations lacking the required skill levels, it will take time to achieve stable economic development or military security. In the economic sector there is a real dependence on the petroleum industry and trade at the international level.

A result is that the GCC leadership has begun to focus on diversification and development in other areas of the petroleum industry to achieve longterm economic development goals. However, even with the similarities in national resources it was external security threats that provided the impetus for establishing the GCC in 1981. The leadership understands that longterm development and stability are most achievable as a group.

As Dougherty and Pfalzgraff note there are two approaches of political integration. The first, as noted in the above discussion, applies to the national resources of the GCC

member nations because it argues that political systems gain and retain cohesiveness because of widely shared values among their members and general agreement about the framework of the system. (1990, 431).

The second approach states that political systems become or remain cohesive because of the presence, or threat of force. (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff 1990, 431). Again, this approach applies to the GCC because the presence and threat of force in the region served as the catalyst to establishing the organization. A discussion of the historical background and formation of the GCC will amply describe the interconnectedness of these factors with regard to the establishment of the organization and integration.

External Factors

It was not until regional events of the early 1980s began to affect the domestic setting of the GCC nations that action was taken. Christie notes “talks moved fast in 1979 when the Shah was overthrown and the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, the areas defenses began to look thin,” (1987,10). In 1980, the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq war also added to the member states nervousness, but “from the outset (the GCC) emphasized economic and social aims and... any suggestion that a military alliance was in the making was avoided,” (Christie 1987,10).

Bill and Leiden state that the GCC was “formed partially in response to the revolutionary threats that accelerated in the region because of the Iranian revolution,” (1984, 409). Ramazani notes the Iran-Iraq war had some effect on GCC formation and the

members continued security. "The principle of (indivisibility of) the security of the six nations was accepted, as was the idea of collective self-reliance, the security of the Gulf region must be maintained by littoral states," (1988, 67).

As Ramazani states, "the GCC was created as an economic grouping like the EEC but subsequently it became a political and security mechanism in response to perceived threats to internal and external security" (1988, 192).

And Zahlan states that, "When the GCC came together in 1981, the groundwork for the organization was already prepared. The GCC was ready for more measures to strengthen and promote closer ties," (1989, 138).

Official documents state the reasons for the establishment of the GCC as "their realization of special relations, common characteristics and similar regimes that govern them; out of their feeling of the importance of establishing close coordination in all spheres; especially the economic and social domains..." (Ramazani 1988, 13). Economic and social cooperation and coordination were seen as the best way to gain regional security and stability, although these militaristic terms were not expressly stated as Christie has already argued. External factors affecting small states proved an impetus to establishing a RIGO attempting regional cooperation as a way to foster stability via economic development and security.

Bill and Leiden (1984), Zahlan (1989), and Novati (1985) also perceived Saudi Arabia as the "driving force" behind the organization, no doubt for several reasons. One reason was the regional threat from Iran's revolution, another was Saudi Arabia's

economic development, and its position as a “swing-producer” for OPEC which made it a regional power at the time. “Saudi Arabia became the successor to the British vis-a-vis the Gulf States,” (Zahlan 1989,134).

The Gulf Cooperation Council

The GCC was formally established on 26th May, 1981, at the Abu Dhabi Supreme Council Meeting. Serious discussions on the formation of the organization began in January and early February of that year when foreign ministers of the eventual council announced the idea.

Christie points out that there are more than “sixty official pan-Arab and inter-Arab organizations covering almost every kind of field,” (1987,12).

“Any alliance or close combination of countries is founded, in the first instance, on perceived identity of interests among parties involved and on an assessment that more is gained in association than to be had in isolation. The identity of interest may be of any kind -- political, economic, military, or cultural -- but a common denominator is essential,” (1987, 7).

Previous talks on a regional organization had occurred intermittently since the early 1970s, when the majority of the Gulf nations received independence from the United Kingdom. As Christie explains, “In 1976, another effort was made to arrive at Arab regional consensus. Kuwait’s Amir toured the region to discuss joint action to preserve the region’s security... in the face of political, economic, and security challenges,” (1987, 9).

The Charter of the GCC consists of 22 articles that establish the decision process for procedural and substantive issues at all the institutional levels of the GCC. The preamble clearly explains that common national attributes and views on long term development would be more successfully implemented in a structure that promoted cooperation, integration and coordination.

There were differences of opinion on the GCC's original function. "When the Charter was being drawn up Kuwait and Oman both submitted working papers. Kuwait suggested the administrative constitution of the proposed organization and the broad outlines that policies might follow. This was accepted with minor alterations," (Christie 1987,11). Christie points out that Oman's suggestions were militarily driven. Oman believed that "the Gulf nations were inadequate by themselves to ensure successful defense of the region," (1987, 11).

Novati contends that there were three different concepts of the GCC's purpose. Kuwait gave priority to economic cooperation; Saudi Arabia, placed emphasis on both economic factors and security of the region; and Oman proposed one main security issue, defense of the Straits of Hormuz as a first step towards a collective defense system (1985,112). "The final agreement was a result of mediation between these positions" (Novati 1985, 112).

Structure and Institutions of the GCC

The structure of the GCC is such that all the GCC leaders are involved. The GCC has three structural levels. The highest level is the Supreme Council which consists of the leaders of the six member nations. The other two structural institutions of the GCC are the Ministerial Council and the Secretariat General.

The Supreme Council

The Supreme Council, consisting of the six heads of state, deals with important GCC, regional, and international issues. The Charter calls for one ordinary annual meeting and ratifies recommendations and resolutions from the ministerial level and the directorates in the secretariat. The council, more importantly, develops consensus on important political, economic, and security issues (E. Peterson 1988, 107). Voting at this level requires a majority vote on procedural issues for formal agreement and unanimous approval, by those member states constituting a quorum, on substantive matters (E. Peterson 1988, 107). Each head of state has one vote therefore consensus plays an important role in any substantive matter.

Also at the Supreme Council level is the Commission for Settlement of Disputes which provides “recommendations to the Supreme Council in cases of disagreement over interpretation of the Charter or disputes between member states,” (E. Peterson 1988, 109). The presidency of the Supreme Council rotates alphabetically at the summit conference each year.

The Ministerial Council

The next level consists of “minister-level representatives,” usually the foreign ministers. This council has regular meetings every three months and “constitutes the principal forum for the mechanics of the GCC” (E. Peterson 1988,110). The council’s presidency rotates alphabetically every six months. Its functions are to “propose policies, prepare recommendations, studies and projects aimed at developing cooperation and cooperation between member states...” (GCC Charter, in E. Peterson 1988, 242).

They act as an important middle level in the GCC where recommendations are sent to the Supreme Council and also further study at the Secretariat by committees is reviewed. At the same time the Ministerial Council approves reports and the summit agenda and is very involved in promoting cooperation and coordination within the GCC and providing mediation and support for regional and international issues.

The Secretariat General

The final level of the GCC is the Secretariat General which is headquartered in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The functions of the secretariat are to prepare studies and reports on the organization’s work and projects, to follow up on any resolutions, agreements, treaties and recommendations the Supreme Council or Ministerial Council enact.

They also prepare “the draft of administrative and financial regulations,... the GCC's budget and closing accounts,... preparations for meetings, recommend to the Ministerial Council the convocation of an extraordinary session,...” and any other tasks

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cooperation, integration and coordination in economic, military, security, and political aspects of the policies and projects they implement.

In the following three chapters, I will discuss the economic, security, and political issue area foreign policy outcome results.

Chapter 3

ECONOMIC ISSUE AREA RESULTS FOR THE GCC

Introduction

This chapter discusses the economic outcomes for 1981 through 1994 at the domestic, regional and international levels. An explanation of the results with reference to the theoretical reasons small nations join RIGOs and the internal and external factors that may influence economic outcomes is also included. The domestic level consists of GCC nations; the regional level, of countries and organizations in the Middle East; and the international level, countries and organizations in the rest of the world.

Following Gallhofer and Saris, I treat the economic-developmental issue area as comprising “all those issues which involve the acquisition and allocation of resources, such as trade, aid and foreign investment,” (1996, 178). The GCC response to such an economic event is recorded in the study’s coded event outcome data. The economic issue area incorporates discussion on, and agreements pertaining to economic aid and development at the domestic, regional, or international level; the oil, gas and petrochemicals industries; manufacturing and metal industries; finance and banking

services; shipping and transportation; agriculture and fisheries; labor; and telecommunications.

Two scales are used to determine whether the GCC provided a forum for regional cooperation. The first scale is level of success, the second is level of diplomatic acts. The level of success scale is an evaluation of the outcomes from the perspective of the GCC. Outcomes were coded; success, satisfied; neutral, further study; and not satisfied, no success. This scaling is used to judge the success rate of GCC outcomes by level and issue area. Level of diplomatic acts is the scale used to depict the political energy expended by the GCC on issue area outcomes. The categories for this scale are, from low to high; verbal statements, talks and meetings, treaties and agreements, and aid, assistance, or sanctions. (Azar et al. 1972; Hermann et al. 1973; Burgess and Lawton 1972). The two scales, level of success, and level of diplomatic acts, therefore evaluate the regional cooperation ability of the GCC regarding economic issue area outcomes.

Results

The overall results demonstrate that the GCC's interest in economic outcomes fell in third place after political and security outcomes. Out of 1372 total outcomes coded, only 21.4% or 294 outcomes were economic. There were 51.4% (151 of 294) economic outcomes that were domestic. The regional level was the smallest category coded with 7.8% (23) outcomes, and the international level had 40.8% (120 outcomes). Thus GCC

interest in economic issues is primarily domestic and secondarily international. This is a consistent trend over the study period.


The three largest economic issue area types coded were; domestic economic development, with 31.6% or 93 of 294 outcomes; oil, gas and petrochemicals, with 27.9% or 82; and international economic development, with 14.3% or 42 outcomes. Event outcomes therefore primarily focused on oil and economic development projects at both the domestic and international levels.

Chronology of Economic Outcome Results

Economic event outcomes for 1981 to 1994 are detailed below. The graph in Figure 3.1 depicting the total number of economic issue area outcomes for each year of the study period.

Figure 3.1

Economic Issue Area Outcomes for the GCC, 1981-1994



There were few economic issue area outcomes for 1981 and those recorded were domestic economic development, with 92.3% or 12 of 13 outcomes with 7.7% or 1 outcome in shipping and transportation. Events during this year related to the establishment of the GCC's economic agreements, primarily the Unified Economic Agreement (UEA). Table 3.2 shows the economic issue area outcomes for the largest three categories for each year of the study period. During 1982 and 1983 outcomes increased rapidly to 41 and 40 outcomes respectively. In 1982 the economic outcomes involved domestic economic development projects and their feasibility studies with 46.3% or 19 of 41 outcomes; oil, gas, and petrochemicals, with 31.7% or 13; and finance and banking with 14.6% or 6 outcomes.

Table 3.2
Annual Economic Issue Areas for 1981-1994

Year	Issue type: Category 1	Category 2	Category 3
1981	domestic issues 92.3% 12	shipping 7.7% 1	
1982	domestic issues 46.3% 19/41	oil 31.7% 13	finance 14.6% 6
1983	domestic issues 45% 18/40	oil 35% 14	finance 7.5% 3
1984	shipping 40.9% 9/22	oil* 27.3% 6	domestic issues* 27.3% 6
1985	oil 48.7% 19/39	domestic issues 20.5% 8	finance 15.4% 6

1986	oil 45% 9/20	domestic issues* 15% 3	shipping* 15% 3	
1987	int'l issues* 9.4% 5/17	shipping* 29.4% 5	oil 23.5% 4	
1988	oil 38.9% 7/18	domestic issues 33.3% 6	int'l issues*, shipping* 11.1% 11.1% 2 2	
1989	domestic issues* 36.4% 4/11	int'l issues* 36.4% 4	oil 27.2% 3	
1990	int'l issues 46.7% 7/15	finance 26.7% 4	regional issues 20% 3	
1991	regional issues* 33% 5/15	finance* 33% 5	domestic issues**, int'l issues** 13.3% 13.3% 2 2	
1992	domestic issues 80% 4/5	finance 20% 1		
1993	int'l issues 40% 10/25	oil 20% 5	domestic issues*, regional issues*, finance* 12% each 3 each	
1994	int'l issues 38.4% 5/13	domestic issues 30.8% 4	oil*, regional issues*, finance*, agriculture* 7.7% each 1 each	

KEY: domestic economic development issues, shipping and transportation, oil, gas and petrochemicals, finance and banking, international economic development issues, regional economic development issues, agriculture and fisheries. * = tied categories, ** = second grouping of tied categories.

In 1983 the categories were the same as 1982 with domestic economic development with 45% or 18 of 40 outcomes; oil, gas and petrochemicals with 35% or 14; and finance and banking with 7.5% or 3 outcomes. Talks and treaties were instigated in an attempt to implement the first stage of the UEA and to gain consensus on oil pricing and

production levels with regard to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) quotas.

In 1984 there was a decrease in the consideration of economic issues to 22, with the most significant category shipping and transportation with 40.9% or 9 of 22 outcomes because of the start of the Tanker War. This was a period of the Iran-Iraq war, from 1984 to 1988, where attacks on regional and international shipping in the Gulf sea-lanes were common. Oil, gas and petrochemicals, and domestic economic development were the other main categories with 27.3% or 6 outcomes each. In 1985 outcomes increased to 39 with oil, gas and petrochemicals, the most important category with 48.7% or 19 of 39 outcomes; domestic economic development with 20.5% or 8 outcomes was next; and finance and banking with 15.4% or 6 outcomes was third. The Tanker War precipitated the need to diversify domestic economies and the Gulf Investment Corporation established in 1982, with headquarters in Kuwait, "inaugurated treasury operations in May 1985 and entered the international securities market in August 1985," (E. Peterson 1988, 152) as a way to maintain and improve GCC investment revenues. Economic issues were greater from 1982 to 1985 because of concern over the Tanker War, and attempts to implement the UEA and stabilize oil prices and production.

In 1986, oil, gas and petrochemicals with 45% or 9 of 20 outcomes the largest category; with domestic economic development, and shipping and transportation with 15% or 3 outcomes each. From 1987 to 1989 economic outcomes were fairly low with 17, 18, and 11 outcomes respectively. In 1987 outcomes centered on international

economic development, and shipping and transportation with 29.4% or 5 of 17 outcomes each; and oil, gas and petrochemicals with 23.5% or 4 outcomes. Oil, gas and petrochemicals, was the largest category in 1988 with 38.9% or 7 of 18 outcomes. Domestic economic development had 33.3% or 6 outcomes; and international economic development, and shipping and transportation had 11.1% or 2 outcomes each. The GCC was still concerned with the Iran-Iraq war and their ability to maintain oil exports. Kuwait had reflagged its tankers under the auspices of the USA in late 1986 and the GCC's diplomatic activity reoriented with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia strong supporters of Iraq and the other GCC member states more ambivalent, maintaining contacts with Iran. (E. Peterson 1988, 127). In 1989 domestic economic development and international economic development with 36.4% or 4 of 11 outcomes each were the largest categories; followed by oil, gas and petrochemicals with 27.2% or 3 outcomes.

The years 1990 and 1991 both had 15 outcomes. Oil and domestic development dropped away as significant categories. Indeed regional and international development, and finance outcomes were the most important. 1990 saw international economic development with 46.7% or 7 of 15 outcomes; next was finance and banking with 26.7% or 4; and regional economic development with 20% or 3 outcomes. In 1991 regional economic development and finance and banking had 33% or 5 of 15 outcomes each; with domestic economic development and international economic development with 13.3% or 2 outcomes each. This change is primarily related to the signing of the Damascus Declaration, also known as "the 6 plus 2" agreement, between the GCC, Egypt and Syria. An important aspect of the agreement was its economic significance particularly to Egypt

who was hoping for assistance on debts to the USA. Ultimately the Damascus Declaration became an agreement existing largely on paper. Egypt and Syria were soon disenchanted as few benefits were forthcoming and also the anticipated new Arab world order did not materialize.

In 1992 five outcomes were recorded and centered once again on domestic economic development with 80% or 4 of 5 outcomes and finance and banking with 20% or 1 outcome. 1993 saw outcomes increase to 25 with international economic development the largest category with 40% or 10 of 25 outcomes; oil, gas and petrochemicals, had 20% or 5 outcomes; and domestic economic development, regional economic development, and finance and banking, had 12% or 3 outcomes each. The increase in outcomes and change in perspective can be attributed to the aftermath of the Kuwait conflict and the GCC's concern with improving domestic economic development. This involved international development discussions and meetings with the EC, Japan and the USA. By 1994 economic outcomes had declined to 13 and focused on international economic development with 38.4% or 5 of 13 outcomes; domestic economic development with 30.8% or 4 outcomes; and oil, gas and petrochemicals, regional economic development, finance and banking, and agriculture and fisheries rounded out the results with 7.7% or 1 outcome each. The Damascus Declaration had lost significance and the GCC realized development of international trading links was the most germane and prudent approach to future economic development.

Table 3.2 shows a trend developed over the 14 year study period with the largest economic issue area categories being domestic economic development, oil, gas and petrochemicals, and international economic development. Finance and banking and shipping and transportation also show at regular intervals. Economic concerns were greater during the first five years of the organization because of concerns over implementing the Unified Economic Agreement. This agreement was designed to improve economic cooperation between the member states. There was also concern over continuing oil exports during the Iran-Iraq war, particularly in the earlier years when shipping attacks were common. Economic events declined after 1985 because the GCC's interests were focused on security and political issues that required greater attention. The next section gives further discussion of the results with an analysis of the economic outcomes at the domestic, regional, and international levels.

Domestic Level

A total of 151 or 51.4% of the GCC economic outcomes were recorded at the domestic level. Table 3.3 shows the level of success scale for the domestic level economic outcomes with 39.1% or 59 of 151 outcomes in the success category; 53% or 80 in the neutral, further study category; and 7.9% or 12 outcomes in the no success category. The largest category for this level was further study, neutral, with more than half of the outcomes. This result is consistent with further explanation of the domestic level outcomes and theoretical discussions.

The results of the second scale shown in Table 3.4, the level of diplomatic acts, of the GCC at the domestic economic level, has 15.2% or 23 of 151 outcomes in verbal statements; 43.7% or 66 outcomes in the talks and meetings category; 39.7% or 60 outcomes in treaties and agreements; and 1.3% or 2 outcomes in the aid or sanctions category.

Table 3.3

Level of Success of Domestic Economic Outcomes

Success level	Number	%
success	59	39.1
neutral	80	53
no success	12	7.9
Total	151	100

The results of the second scale show economic outcomes centered at the mid to high range with talks and meetings and treaties and agreements the largest categories. The GCC realized the importance of economic issue outcomes to their long and short-term development. However, the majority of the outcomes were in the further study category on the first scale meaning that although economic issues were of great concern issues of national sovereignty meant further study of economic agreements was necessary. This was particularly noticeable with the UEA, an economic cooperation agreement that was

adopted at the November 1981 summit conference. The agreement has seven chapters and 28 articles covering aspects of economic interaction between the member nations. These include trade exchange, movement of capital, citizens, and the exercise of economic activities, coordination of development, technical cooperation, transport and communication, and financial and monetary cooperation (E. Peterson 1988, 263-269).

Table 3.4

Level of Diplomatic Acts of Domestic Economic Outcomes

Diplomatic acts	Number	%
verbal	23	15.2
talks	66	43.7
treaties	60	39.8
aid	2	1.3
Total	151	100

In general, issues addressed at this level included the procedural establishment of the UEA treaty and the attempted implementation of all aspects of stage I and the promotion of stage II. Indeed, stage I was supposed to be implemented by all member nations during the first five years of the GCC's establishment. Concerns over national sovereignty and security meant that certain aspects of the UEA were delayed or ignored. An example was the move to attain a common tariff barrier on goods imported from

outside the region. Although a common external tariff (CET) of 13.4% was agreed upon, limited exceptions were approved, in particular for Oman. (E. Peterson 1988, 151).

Another problem in implementing the UEA involved the movement of goods between member nations. Meetings by the GCC attempted to reduce the paperwork so that companies could trade goods more easily across member-state national boundaries, but there was confusion over the UEA guidelines, paperwork needed and the actual regulations introduced. Delays were customary for companies attempting to import or export goods and it took some time before a common system appeared. Bureaucratic delays resulting from changes in paperwork and confusion over regulations pertaining to the new agreement hampered the success of the UEA. By the end of the first five years of the GCC's operation there were vocal exhortations by both the Supreme Council leadership and the Ministerial Council leadership for full implementation of stage I and movement to the next stage of the UEA as quickly as possible. This was due to the international economic level the GCC was negotiating with the EC in an attempt to obtain favored trading status particularly on petroleum exports and petroleum by-products.

Other economic issues focused on the petroleum industry, and finance and banking. The GCC obtained success and consensus on implementing a common oil production and pricing agreement during the mid 1980s. The member states, some non-OPEC states, all agreed to abide by OPEC's production quota policy and to cut their production accordingly. This was an attempt to stabilize international oil prices and maintain the oil market share OPEC nations had gained since the 1970s.

In finance and banking, outcomes centered on the Gulf Investment Corporation's establishment and operations; the GCC's ability to continue the OPEC production quota policy, especially during the Tanker War; the rebuilding of Kuwait; and aspects of the domestic development projects the GCC had agreed to finance.

Regional Level Economic Outcomes

Regional economic issue area outcomes was the smallest category over the study period 1981-1994 and only 7.8% or 23 outcomes were recorded at this level. On the first scale shown in Table 3.5 these outcomes centered primarily in the neutral, further study category with 39.1% or 9 outcomes; with success and no success having 30.4% or 7 outcomes each.

Table 3.5

Level of Success of Regional Economic Outcomes

Success level	Number	%
success	7	30.4
neutral	9	39.1
no success	7	30.4
Total	23	100

In the second scale depicted in Table 3.6, the cross-tabulation of the level of diplomatic acts, had 13% or 3 of the outcomes in verbal statements; 43.5% or 10 outcomes in talks and meetings; 26.1% or 6 outcomes in treaties and agreements; and

17.4% or 4 outcomes in the aid or sanctions category. The regional level economic outcomes can be classified as mid to high range with events focusing on meetings and talks, treaties and agreements, and aid and sanctions.

Table 3.6

Level of Diplomatic Acts for Regional Economic Outcomes

Diplomatic acts	Number	%
verbal	3	13
talks	10	43.5
treaties	6	26.1
aid	4	17.4
Total	23	100

Event outcomes recorded at this level centered on the shipping attacks of the Tanker War during the Iran-Iraq war. The Tanker War was at its height from 1984 to 1988 and GCC outcomes were recorded in the shipping category reflecting the organization's concern for this issue in 1984, and 1986-1988. The other important regional outcome recorded in 1990-1991 and 1993 was the Damascus Declaration. Other issues noted at this level involved discussion and granting of economic aid to the Palestinians, rescinding of this aid after the PLO supported Iraq during the invasion of Kuwait, and the rescinding of aid to Jordan for the same reason.

None of the actions with regard to the Damascus Declaration were fully or partially implemented. After the invasion and liberation of Kuwait both Syria and Egypt requested aid from the GCC. Egypt also asked for assistance in repaying its military loan debts to the USA. The Damascus Declaration rested on the GCC establishing an economic agreement with the other two signatories, Egypt and Syria. The initial agreement envisaged a development fund for industrial and agricultural projects in these nations with capital of \$10 billion. Several months later this figure had decreased to \$7.5 billion when it was realized that certain GCC countries would be unable to contribute to the fund. Talks surrounding the economic agreement then stalled and the final results of the implementation of the economic aspects of the declaration are uncertain. Certainly Egypt and Syria did not receive economic aid or assistance with regional economic projects at anywhere near the level they had hoped for.

International Level Results

International economic outcomes accounted for 40.8% or 120 outcomes and was the second largest of the economic issue area outcome levels. The level of success cross-tab shown in Table 3.7 depicts the outcome results for this scale. Both the success and further study categories had 46.7% or 56 outcomes; with 6.7% or 8 outcomes categorized as not successful. This result, tied to the outcome results in the second scale depicted in Table 3.8 explain the importance of economic outcomes for the GCC at the international level.

Table 3.7**Level of Success of International Level Economic Outcomes**

Success level	Number	%
success	56	46.6
neutral	56	46.7
no success	8	6.7
Total	120	100

On the level of diplomatic acts scale the largest category was meetings and talks with 58.3% or 70 outcomes; treaties and agreements was next with 25.8% or 31 outcomes followed by; verbal statements with 12.5% or 15 outcomes; and aid or sanctions with 3.3% or 4 outcomes. The results show that at the international level the GCC conducted economic policy at the mid range with over half the outcomes in talks and meetings and another 25% of the outcomes in the treaties and agreements category.

Generally the international level of the economic issue area outcomes centered on trade and oil talks conducted with other international or regional organizations such as the EC, UN, and OPEC. This result in itself is significant in that outcomes at this level primarily involved organization to organization contact and were important for GCC economic development.

Table 3.8**Level of Diplomatic Acts of International Level Economic Outcomes**

Diplomatic acts	Number	%
verbal	15	12.5
talks	70	58.3
treaties	31	25.8
aid	4	3.3
Total	120	100

Other international level of economic outcomes involved talks on the attacks on international shipping during the Iran-Iraq war and trade talks conducted with Japan and the USA.

Most of the economic outcomes involved talks with the EC over implementation of a GCC common market and favored trading status. At first discussions centered on the EC's implementation of a carbon tax on oil and petrochemical by-products. After several rounds of talks and lobbying by the GCC the EC realized the tax was unpopular, not only with the GCC, but also with the EC's own members, and eventually the plan was dropped.

The conclusion of this first level of contact with the EC resulted in further talks on gaining favored trading status. The EC agreed that the GCC must work on implementing a common market before this would be possible. The common market, (and favored trading status), was seen as an important goal by the GCC and affected domestic level outcomes because the Supreme and Ministerial Council levels of the GCC began to urge the General

Secretariat to work harder on implementing the UEA regulations and guidelines. The leadership also pushed for stage I to be completed and stage II to be introduced as quickly as possible. The GCC's goal for a common market is set for 2000 so there is little time to overcome problems with tariff barriers and implementation of the UEA in all member nations.

The trade talks were considered an important topic by the Summit and Ministerial leadership. Several meetings took place at the ministerial level involving oil, and trade ministers, and the foreign ministers of the GCC nations. Consensus was reached on a GCC position for bargaining and discussion with the EC on oil and trade development issues.

This conduct in international economic policy was also seen on outcomes with relevance to OPEC. Because of the Iran-Iraq war oil prices dropped substantially in the mid-1980's resulting in great concern for the domestic economies and international export earnings of the GCC nations. Several GCC nations are members of OPEC and at the time had a high level of influence within the international organization. OPEC agreed that to salvage world oil prices production must be cut. At this time Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other Gulf states, had increased production because Iran and Iraq were offstream. This meant even at the lower oil export prices they could accrue the financial resources needed to meet domestic and international demands.

Oman had begun to produce refined oil and with Bahrain was a benefactor of domestic infrastructure projects, many later cancelled because of the continued drop in oil prices. When OPEC announced a cut in production the GCC oil ministers and the foreign

ministers met to decide what position to take. Even though Bahrain and Oman were not members of OPEC they agreed with the other GCC members to follow OPEC guidelines and all GCC nations announced production quotas.

The second time there was concern over oil pricing and production a Qatari representative was chosen as the GCC ambassador and sent to sound out non-OPEC oil producing nations to see whether they would also agree to production cut-backs so international oil prices could be salvaged. This was unsuccessful but showed the GCC on two occasions during the course of the Iran-Iraq war was able to achieve consensus and agreement on production quotas.

The GCC achieved positive results at meetings with the EC and OPEC and generally were able to follow through on issues discussed. However, with the EC those aspects of common market implementation will take longer due to domestic constraints, and national sovereignty issues.

Hypothesis and the GCC Economic Outcomes

The first hypothesis states that:

H1: The GCC will be more active in economic issue area outcomes at the domestic or international level.

The results show this is indeed the case. This is because the GCC nations are dependent on the international arena and trading partners such as the EC, USA and Japan for their export revenues. As East noted "a substantial proportion of small-state foreign

policies are concerned with economic issues,” (1975, 160). And as Reid states, “The major hypothesis that can be made about microstate participation in international affairs is that participation will be based predominantly on economic issues.” (1974, 30).

The results depict GCC interest in economic issue area outcomes at both the domestic and international level supporting earlier studies with small-state centered approaches. At the same time a caveat is needed. Most of the GCC’s economic outcomes place in the neutral, further study category. This is because the member states were implementing economic policy from an organizational perspective rather than a national perspective. Therefore, further study was needed to iron out sovereignty issues and to decide how regulations would be worded and implemented.

As the example of the European Community suggests, the GCC may need to become a common market to gain any economic stature at the international level. At the same time the member states understand their constraints: a single major export, and the need to sell this product for the best possible price on the international market. The effect of declining oil prices and the continuation of the Iran-Iraq war resulted in a cancellation or postponement of most of the domestic development projects the GCC was attempting to establish in Oman, Bahrain and other member states.

It is possible to understand the opportunities and constraints placed on the GCC and note that external and internal factors affected the organization’s economic issue area outcomes. The issue area is one of importance to the GCC, especially at the domestic and international levels.

External Factors

External factors affected the member states' economies because oil prices fell during the Iran-Iraq war and this one industry affects all aspects of GCC nations' economic and national sovereignty. The member nations knew they would gain greater economic benefits as a RIGO; for example consensus in trade talks and their potential in donating or sanctioning economic aid and reaching consensus on an oil pricing and production agreement. They understood there was a need to implement the UEA as soon as possible. Indeed, internal factors, the bureaucracy issues of sovereignty, undermined results the GCC leaders were expecting to achieve.

At all levels of the economic issue area, but particularly at the domestic and international levels, external factors are significant in producing GCC foreign policy outcomes. In the arena of economic issues the GCC saw a need for consensus by member states. They achieved a mid-range level of regional cooperation on economic issues but because of the nature of the issues and the need for further study the level of success was not as high as expected. This was noticeable in the results and by comments at the Ministerial and Supreme Council levels with regard to the UEA.

Internal Factors

In the economic issue area the Ministerial and Supreme Councils were marginally more interested in domestic outcomes. The GCC was originally established to achieve regional integration as an economic organization and the Charter and Unified Economic

Agreement (UEA) reflect this. The leadership also recognized that to attain regional cooperation the domestic economic infrastructure had to be expanded so that trade between the member nations would be on an equal footing and potentially increase between them. This was a major reason for the UEA and the leaderships' push for implementation as quickly as possible.

The similar political structures of the member nations allowed the GCC to achieve the mid-range of success noted in the economic issue area outcomes. Implementation of the UEA occurred by varying degrees within member nations but this has become a barrier to EC favored trading status because it is delaying the establishment of a GCC common market.

Theory and Economic Results

As mentioned earlier small states are said to join RIGOs to gain power, have a voice in the international arena and thus acquire opportunities for themselves. East portrayed a model of small state behavior that said these states would show low levels of participation in international affairs, high levels of activity in intergovernmental organizations, high support for international legal norms, avoidance of force or behavior that may alienate more powerful states, and a narrow functional and geographic range of concern in foreign policy (1975, 160).

What the GCC exemplifies is a RIGO compelled to act in the international arena because of the nature of its only economic resource. This explains the GCC's high level of

activity with other intergovernmental organizations such as OPEC, and the EC. The GCC is able to “focus attention on specific local issues and mobilize resources... exert influence... on larger states by appealing to mutual interests,” (Papadakis & Starr 1987, 426). The GCC did this when it conducted talks with the EC, another RIGO, on trade and oil policies that link both the domestic and international arenas. To some extent this behavior was also seen when the GCC agreed to implement OPEC production quotas.

Both of the theoretical approaches for regional cooperation are apparent in the GCC's economic issue area outcomes. First, the organization's political structure and thus its procedural and substantive consensus provide a framework for opportunities and constraints. Because of the political leadership the GCC was able to put a procedural structure in place and gain consensus on substantive issues very quickly. This is consistent with Dougherty and Pfalzgraff's argument that “the greater the procedural and substantive consensus the greater the integration of the political system.” (1990, 431).

Second, the presence or threat of force is said to be a catalyst for establishing such an organization. This was true from an economic perspective with regard to the establishment of the GCC. The implications of regional conflict affected member nation's domestic economies when oil exports were threatened and the price of oil on the international market fell. Cooperation within the GCC is apparent because states have adapted “their behavior to the needs of the others by means of a process of policy coordination,” (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff 1990, 170). But greater influence needs to be

exerted internally for all member nations to adopt the UEA and thus move toward the goal of a common market by 2000.

Karns and Mingst hold that states may join IGOs for various reasons: interest aggregation, collective influence and bargaining; as a vehicle for collective legitimization of their foreign policy actions and to delegitimize others; to create international public policy and for influencing other states policies; to provide frameworks for multilateral cooperation in different issue areas, enhancing opportunities for different states to exercise influence in different issue areas and organizations; and to provide opportunities for bilateral and multilateral discussion. (1987, 468-469).

The GCC illustrates Karns and Mingst's points in the following ways. The member nations joined the GCC because they understood that collective influence on economic issues would be more beneficial to all especially at the international level. They played a significant role in OPEC and were able to successfully lobby to get the planned carbon tax dropped by the EC and the USA. The member states attempted to use the GCC as "a vehicle for collective legitimization of their foreign policy actions" (Karns and Mingst 1987, 468) particularly in petroleum related issues because more was at stake for members with regard to this industry. Also at the regional level the GCC was used as a "vehicle for collective legitimization of their foreign policy actions and the downplaying of other foreign policy actions,..." (Karns and Mingst 1987, 468-469). Examples are the economic sanctions threatened or placed on regional Arab nations after they sided with Iraq during the invasion of Kuwait.

The international level directly affects domestic national economic policy and thus the GCC could be used to “create international public policy and influence other state’s policies.” (Karns and Mingst 1987, 468-469). Again, this was attempted with oil pricing when Qatar visited non-OPEC nations to attempt to gain agreement on standard world oil pricing during the mid-1980s. It was also visible in lobbying attempts by the GCC nations, especially Saudi Arabia, for the removal of the carbon tax.

The GCC also “provided a framework for multilateral cooperation in economic issues and enhanced opportunities for different states to exercise influence in different issue areas and organizations,” (Karns and Mingst 1987, 469) in this case Saudi Arabia, and other member states in OPEC.

The GCC “provided opportunities both for bilateral discussion” with the EC, Japan and USA, and also for multilateral discussions within the GCC on EC and OPEC policy and at the regional level in the economic agreement attempted under the Damascus Declaration. Karns and Mingst’s final point also shows the GCC “provided opportunities for bilateral and multilateral discussion between member states.” (Karns and Mingst 1987, 469). Bilateral opportunities were visible at the domestic level with additional trade agreements between the member nations of the UAE and Oman.

The GCC was therefore a fairly successful framework for member states to initialize activities in the economic issue area at both the domestic and international levels and to a lesser extent the regional level.

Conclusion

Economic issue area outcomes provided a complicated set of opportunities and constraints to the GCC. External factors greatly affected the domestic economies of the member states and therefore the organization. This ultimately led to the decision to form the RIGO so that common economic policy could be achieved thus helping all the GCC states' economies attain some stability. Internally the leadership realized this was the best way to achieve a sense of economic security but at the same time were wary of reducing national tariff barriers or implementing certain aspects of the UEA because of the ramifications these moves might have on their populations, industries, and domestic economies.

The organization has enjoyed continued support from the leadership who understand that the GCC presents real economic opportunities to member states who are currently relying on a single industry for their economic revenue.

The GCC has shown it can promote regional cooperation in economic outcomes at the domestic and international levels. The twinning of economic issue area outcomes at the domestic and international levels makes sense because the member nations are reliant on oil sales at the international level for their continued existence at the domestic level. Negotiating, bargaining and attempting to influence other organizations and nations is understood as the only way the GCC will continue to see any success and growth in their member nations' economies. Leadership believe that because of the nature of their economies opportunities for economic development will only occur under the umbrella of

a RIGO. Economic survival depends on the two levels and explains why the GCC leadership emphasizes the need to overcome domestic constraints visible in implementing the UEA. Common interests are visible between the member nations on economic issues. However, it will take time to implement the organization's economic legislation especially when the domestic level is linked to the international level where oil exports are at the mercy of market prices. Unfortunately to gain any real advantages at the international level the GCC needs to implement its common market in 2000 so its members can obtain any opportunities available under favored trading status treaties with the EC and other trading partners.

The results of this chapter show the GCC achieved a mid-range of regional cooperation on the level of diplomatic acts scale. But on the level of success scale the majority of outcomes were in the neutral category. This can be attributed to the nature of the issue area where further discussion and talks are needed to iron out major trading agreements both at the domestic and international level. Results show the GCC is concerned with economic issue outcomes at both these levels but internal and external factors have affected economic outcomes and further work is needed to achieve greater success in regional cooperation, particularly at the domestic level with regard to internal factors.

CHAPTER 4

THE SECURITY ISSUE AREA OF RESULTS FOR THE GCC

This chapter examines the GCC's security issue area from 1981 through 1994. The results are examined with reference to the theory of regional cooperation and small state membership in RIGOs, and to internal and external factors that may affect the GCC security outcomes.

The security issue area incorporates events that include discussion on, and agreements pertaining to military expenditures; domestic, regional, or international security issues; coups or attempted coups; riots and/or internal unrest; invasion and/or occupation; war; and border disputes. Therefore "security-military comprises all issues which focus on questions pertaining to violence,...and those which are perceived by the foreign policy elite as constituting a security threat," (Gallhofer & Saris 1996, 178). It is a critical issue area for any nation that wishes to continue as a viable entity in the international system.

As in chapter 3, the level of regional cooperation by the GCC is evaluated by using two scales. These test the level of success and also the level of diplomatic acts for the outcomes coded in the security issue area for the GCC from 1981-1994. The level of satisfaction codes the event outcomes in the categories; satisfied or success, neutral or further study, and not satisfied or no success.

The second scale, level of diplomatic acts uses four categories with the lowest being; verbal statements, then talks and meetings, treaties and agreements, with the highest aid, assistance, or sanctions. The reasoning is that more is at stake in foreign policy outcomes for an organization such as the GCC when aid, assistance or sanctions are expressed. This is in keeping with discussions on the utility of scaling outcomes. Results were compiled by reviewing and coding the event outcomes on the above criteria.

As previously noted, event outcomes can occur at the domestic, regional, or international levels. The domestic level includes the GCC member nations; the regional level includes nations and organizations in the Middle East; and the international level includes all other international organizations and countries.


Results

The overall results demonstrate that the GCC is more involved in security related outcomes on a mid to low-range of regional cooperation than with the economic issue area. The total number of security issue outcomes coded for the study period was 25.7% or 353 of 1372 outcomes. There was 58.3% or 206 outcomes at the domestic level; 30.9% or 109 at the regional level; and 10.8% or 38 at the international level. The results portray a significant interest by the GCC in security issue area outcomes at the domestic level with the regional level the next most important. Few security issue area outcomes are recorded at the international level by the GCC. This trend was consistent over the fourteen year period from 1981-1994.

The three largest issue types coded for the GCC were; domestic military and security issues, with 55.8% or 197 of 353 outcomes; the Iran-Iraq war, with 11.6% or 41; and the invasion and occupation of Kuwait, and border disputes, with 9.3% or 33 outcomes each.

Figure 4.1

GCC Security Outcomes 1981-1994



The graph in Figure 4.1 depicts the annual total of security outcomes for the study period 1981-1994 and the chronology of the security event outcomes is detailed below. It shows the high number of security outcomes for 1981 through 1986, the drop in 1989, and the increase again in the 1990s. The Iran-Iraq war was at its height between 1982 and 1985 and shipping attacks in the Gulf, and also threats made to the GCC nations by Iran, concerned the organization. There were also several conflicts occurring elsewhere in the

Middle East that affected the GCC. The 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the deployment of US troops in Beirut in 1983, and the US bombing of Libya in 1986, all increased tensions in the region and the GCC became involved in attempts to end these conflicts. Security issues dropped away in 1989 with the end of the Iran-Iraq war and the decrease in tensions elsewhere in the region but rose again in 1990 and 1991 with the invasion of Kuwait. Security issues remained high during the 1990s with the resolution of the Kuwait conflict, security aspects of the Damascus Declaration, and domestic and regional border disputes.

Chronology of Security Outcome Results

The first five years of the GCC saw the greatest number of security event outcomes. Table 4.2 depicts the annual results for the largest three categories for the security issue area. In 1981 outcomes centered on domestic security concerns with 48.2% or 13 of 27 outcomes; regional security issues with 44.4% or 12; and coups or coup attempts with 7.4% or 2 outcomes. Generally both much discussion and action resulted from the effects of the start of the Iran-Iraq war.

The GCC was understandably concerned with the threat of regional conflicts and therefore attempts to establish both security and military agreements were implemented. At the end of 1981 the Bahrain government, after receiving information from Dubai, was able to prevent a coup attempt. A number of people were arrested and weapons and

equipment recovered. Internal security cooperation quickly improved when member states realized the sharing of security information had prevented a coup.

Table 4.2

Annual Security Issue Areas for 1981-1994

Year	Issue type: Category 1	Category 2	Category 3
1981	domestic issues 48.2% 13/27	regional issues 44.4% 12/27	coup/coup attempts 7.4% 2/27
1982	domestic issues 81.6% 31/38	invasion 7.9% 3	military expenditures*, regional issues* 5.3% 2 5.3% 2
1983	domestic issues 58.7% 27/46	war 23.9% 11	invasion 6.5% 3
1984	domestic issues 80.5% 29/36	war 11.1% 4	military expenditures 8.3% 3
1985	domestic issues 68.4% 26/38	war 13.1% 5	regional issues 7.9% 3
1986	domestic issues 50% 12/24	border disputes 25% 6	war 16.6% 4
1987	domestic issues 66.6% 10/15	war 26.6% 4	internal unrest 6.6% 1
1988	domestic issues 58.3% 7/12	war 25% 3	regional issues 16.7% 2
1989	domestic issuses 50% 1/2	war 50% 1	

1990	invasion 71.4% 15/21	domestic issues 19% 4	regional issues 4.8% 1
1991	domestic issues 36% 9/25	invasion 28% 7	regional issues 16% 4
1992	domestic issues 45% 9/20	border disputes 20% 4	regional issues*, war* 15% 15% 3 3
1993	border disputes 47.6% 10/21	domestic issues 42.8% 9	military expenditures*, invasion* 4.8% 4.8% 1 1
1994	domestic issues 35.7% 10/28	border disputes 25% 7	war 17.8% 5

KEY: domestic security issues, regional security issues, coup or coup attempts, invasion or occupation, military expenditures, war, border disputes, internal unrest. *=tied categories.

In 1982 events again centered on domestic security issues with 81.5% or 31 of 38 outcomes; invasion or occupation with 7.9% or 3 outcomes was next; with military expenditures, and regional security issues with 5.3% or 2 each. Again in 1983 domestic security issues were prominent with 58.7% or 27 of 46 outcomes; the Iran-Iraq war with 23.9% or 11; and invasion and/or occupation with 6.5% or 3 outcomes.

In 1984 domestic security issues greatly concerned the GCC with 80.5% or 29 of 36 outcomes. The Iran-Iraq war category had 11.1% or 4 outcomes and military expenditures 8.3% or 3. From 1985 to 1989 domestic security issues was the largest security outcome category for the GCC. In 1985 this category accounted for 68.4% or 26 of 38 outcomes; with the Iran-Iraq war with 13.1% or 5; and regional security issues with

7.9% or 3 outcomes. Domestic security issues accounted for 50% or 12 of 24 outcomes in 1986; with border disputes second with 25% or 6; and the Iran-Iraq war with 16.6% or 4.

The number of security outcomes at the domestic level were at their lowest from 1987 to 1989. Again in 1987 domestic security issues was the largest category with 66.6% or 10 of 15 outcomes; the Iran-Iraq war was next with 26.6% or 4; and internal unrest with 6.6% or one outcome. In 1988 domestic security issues was at 58.3% or 7 of 12 outcomes; the Iran-Iraq war and regional security issues with 25% or 3 outcomes each. 1989 had two event outcomes one a domestic security issue and one involving aspects of the Iran-Iraq war.

The year 1990 showed a marked change in outcomes with the majority coded in the invasion and/or occupation category with 71.4% or 15 of 21 outcomes. This change in outcomes was driven by the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq. Domestic security issues accounted for 19% or 4; and regional security issues and border disputes with 4.8% or 1 outcome each. In 1991 domestic security issues accounted for 36% or 9 of 25 outcomes; with invasion and/or occupation with 28% or 7; and regional security issues with 16% or 4 outcomes. Domestic security issues was the largest category for 1992 with 45% or 9 of 20 outcomes; border disputes was next with 20% or 4; and regional security issues and the Iran-Iraq war had 15% or 3 outcomes each.

Border disputes was the largest category in 1993 with 47.6% or 10 of 21 outcomes. Domestic security issues was second with 42.8% or 9 outcomes and military expenditures and invasion and/or occupation had 4.8% or 1 outcome each. Again in 1994

domestic security issues, with 35.7% or 10 of 28 outcomes; border disputes with 25% or 7 outcomes; and the Iran-Iraq war with 17.8% or 5 outcomes were the largest categories.

Throughout the study period the constant trend was concern for domestic security. Indeed during the early years the Iran-Iraq war was the organization's main security and foreign policy concern. This gave way in the 1990s to security issues centered on the invasion of Kuwait and a growing concern with border disputes. An analysis of the results at the domestic, regional, and international levels gives an understanding of the importance of security outcomes to the GCC, particularly at the domestic level.

Domestic Level Security Outcome Results

The most security issue outcomes recorded for twelve of the fourteen years were at the domestic level. This was because of the external regional threats from the Iran-Iraq war, the invasion of Kuwait, and subsequent discussions on security policy for the region. The reason domestic concerns were so high is because regional conflicts can cause domestic instability. The Gulf nations have a high number of migrant workers, and there are also large Shi'a communities in Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia that could trigger unrest.

A total of 206 GCC security outcomes involved the domestic level. In Table 4.3 the level of success scale for domestic security outcomes shows 44.2% or 91 of 206 outcomes coded in the success category; 47.6% or 98 of the outcomes in the neutral, or further study category; and 8.3% or 17 outcomes in no success. The largest category is

the neutral, or further study category, a result which is consistent with theoretical discussions and greater explanation of the domestic level results.

Table 4.3

Level of Success of Domestic Security Outcomes

Success level	Number	%
success	91	44.2
neutral	98	47.6
no success	17	8.2
Total	206	100

The second scale, the level of diplomatic acts, is depicted in Table 4.4. The level of diplomatic acts for the GCC at the domestic level, show that 19.9% or 41 or 206 outcomes were coded at the verbal statements level; 51% or 105 were at the talks and meetings level; and 29.1% or 60 outcomes were coded in the treaties and agreements category. No outcomes were coded in the aid or sanctions category.

Table 4.4

Level of Diplomatic Acts of Domestic Security Outcomes

Diplomatic acts	Number	%
verbal	41	19.9
talks	105	51
treaties	60	29.1
aid	0	0
Total	206	100

Other issues at the domestic level centered on the GCC military agreement and the GCC joint security agreement. These two agreements outlined the GCC's internal security policy and the GCC's military policy to be established by the organization.

Also addressed were issues regarding military expenditures, the attempted coup in Bahrain, crowd unrest and deaths at the Haj in Saudi Arabia, the car bomb attack on the Amir of Kuwait and bombings of buildings and cafes in Kuwait, and several border disputes between GCC member nations. The security and military stability of the member nations were important concerns because of the close proximity of external threats. The chiefs of staff were given the task of planning agreements that would coordinate GCC policy on internal security and also on military matters so that the GCC nations could adequately defend themselves if the Iran-Iraq war spilled over into Kuwait, Saudi Arabia or other member nation's territory.

The joint security agreement was the first GCC document over which dissent within the organization was made public. Kuwait refused to sign the agreement because it's National Assembly was unable to ratify the clause regarding pursuit of criminals for up to 20 kilometers within any GCC member nation's territory. This point was discussed at GCC meetings but signature was delayed several years because no agreement was forthcoming. Finally it was decided Kuwait could opt out on this point while the other member nations who had already signed the agreement would adhere to it. In the meantime all the other aspects of the agreement were put in place. Members quickly began to coordinate security information and training. Much of this information is considered in

the interests of national security so little concrete information on actual decisions and implementations are made public.

The GCC military agreement fared somewhat better. The results of this were the establishment of joint military exercises for GCC national armed forces, navies and air forces. The Peninsula Shield Force (PSF) was established with a core of 10,000 soldiers from the GCC states and was stationed in northwestern Saudi Arabia. Each member contributed military hardware and personnel relative to their size. Prior to the Kuwait conflict the size of the PSF was increased and discussions after the liberation of Kuwait centered on increasing the size of the force so that a larger number of soldiers was available for the PSF. The final figure, to be reached in increments, was decided on as a force of 100,000.

Military coordination was effective and chiefs of staff visited member nations' facilities on fact-finding tours and were able to implement greater coordination across the armed forces. They established the basis of an early warning radar system and attempted coordination of armaments but decided it was best if each nation chose its own armaments and diversification continued.

The level of cooperation has taken longer on the joint security agreement but one timely and effective result was the decision to coordinate domestic security information. The result of this was the capture of key figures in the 1981 attempted coup and overthrow plot in Bahrain. Leadership quickly became supportive of joint security

outcomes at this level because they saw the benefits for their national security and domestic stability.

Leadership was also supportive of military coordination efforts. Military exercises were widely publicized at first and then in 1985 there was an announcement that PSF III would take place only at bilateral levels and subsequent military training would also occur at this level, i.e., the GCC would no longer coordinate mass exercises by all member nations. Since then member nations have held air, naval and ground forces exercises with participation by two or three member nations each time.

Military coordination achieved a core PSF force, decisions on an early warning system, and joint exercises that allowed all member nations to familiarize themselves with each others' armaments, equipment and personnel. The level of training was improved across all the states and GCC naval, army, air force and officer colleges were designated in member nations so that all GCC nationals could attend.

Once these levels of coordination were established the chiefs of staff established a GCC military command and then kept operations at a maintenance level. Leadership made declarations at the Ministerial and Summit council levels that military defense of the region would be up to the GCC and they would not allow regional or international nations or organizations to send forces in to the area. In 1990 this ideal confronted reality when Iraq invaded Kuwait. The GCC Supreme Council then creatively reasoned for a multinational force to liberate Kuwait because this was the only practical solution available.

Regional Level Security Outcomes

Security event outcomes at the regional level account for 30.9% or 109 of 353 outcomes for the study period 1981-1994. The regional security issue area outcomes are almost half of the domestic level security results. External regional factors such as aspects of the Iran-Iraq war, for example, missile attacks on Kuwaiti installations near Faw; the invasion of Kuwait; and the Damascus Declaration were important events at this level.

In Table 4.5 the cross-tabulation of the level of success scale for regional outcomes depicts most of the security outcomes in the success category with 57.8% or 63 of 109 outcomes; 33.9% or 37 outcomes are in the neutral, further study category; and 8.3% or 9 outcomes are in the no success category. Therefore most outcomes are successful at this level.

However, security outcomes are at the mid to low range on the level of diplomatic acts scale with the largest category in Table 4.6 talks and meetings with 61.5% or 67.

Table 4.5

Level of Success of Regional Security Outcomes

Success level	Number	%
success	63	57.8
neutral	37	33.9
no success	9	8.3
Total	109	100

Some 28.4% or 31 outcomes were in the verbal statements, category; with 9.2% or 10 outcomes in the treaties and agreements category; and 0.9% or 1 in the aid and sanctions category. The results from the two scales show that leadership was concerned with matters at this level but at a lower level of diplomatic acts than at the domestic level.

Table 4.6

Level of Diplomatic Acts of Regional Security Outcomes

Diplomatic acts	Number	%
verbal	31	28.4
talks	67	61.5
treaties	10	9.2
aid	1	0.9
Total	109	100

The Damascus Declaration agreement rested on discussion by the six GCC member nations, Syria and Egypt over regional security after the liberation of Kuwait. Originally it was planned that Egypt and Syria would send military advisers and troops to assist in training GCC national forces. However, Kuwait signed military training and rearmament agreements with the USA, UK and USSR. Other GCC nations reacted in a similar manner and the Secretary General of the GCC was forced to publicly announce that member nations were responsible for any decisions made with regard to the training and equipping of their national forces.

At this point both Egypt and Syria realized that, although they were Arab "brother" nations, they were not going to achieve any influence in Gulf military or security

decisions and removed their troops from the multi-national force that had liberated Kuwait. There was also the view that a new Arab world order would materialize from the Declaration, but the less than adequate response by the GCC on regional security matters also negated the envisioned new Arab world order.

At the same time, Iran expressed sentiments that it should be involved in any regional security policy. The GCC began exploratory talks with Iran over future regional security policy. This became a very delicate matter when Iran occupied the Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa islands belonging to the UAE. The result, mediation over the sovereignty of these islands, occurred with the UAE at the same time as the talks with the GCC on Gulf security policy.

International Level Security Outcomes

Only 10.8% or 38 international level security issue area outcomes were coded for the GCC from 1981 to 1994. In Table 4.7 the cross-tabulation of the level of success scale shows the largest category of security outcomes was in the success category with 60.5% or 23 of 38 outcomes. The neutral or further study category had 34.2% or 13 outcomes; and no success had 5.3% or 2 outcomes. Again, as at the regional level, the largest category for this scale was success.

Table 4.7

Level of Success of International Security Outcomes

Success level	Number	%
success	23	60.5
neutral	13	34.2
no success	2	5.3
Total	38	100

The second scale is the cross-tabulation of the level of diplomatic acts for the GCC security outcomes at the international level. Table 4.8 shows that 28.9% or 11 of 38 outcomes were in the verbal statements category; with 50% or 19 outcomes in talks and meetings; and 21.1% or 8 outcomes in the treaties and agreements category. Again there were no outcomes in the aid and sanctions category and overall for this level the two scales depict success at the low to mid-range with most diplomatic acts occurring within the talks and meetings or verbal statements categories.

Table 4.8

Level of Diplomatic Acts of International Level Security Outcomes

Diplomatic acts	Number	%
verbal	11	28.9
talks	19	50
treaties	8	21.1
aid	0	0
Total	38	100

Events involved talks with international organizations and countries regarding regional security and aspects of the Kuwait conflict. The talks with the USA, Japan, and EC member countries focused on aspects of Gulf security, US bases in the area, military arms deals and the role and operations of the multinational force that liberated Kuwait.

Talks at the international level were a setting for the reinforcement of GCC security policy. The GCC stressed it was responsible for maintaining security in the Gulf and did not want superpower involvement. However, during the Kuwait conflict the event outcomes focused on talks with the USA with regard to the multinational force and GCC security policy showed a marked change from previous statements.

Other event outcomes were announcements of arms deals, such as the purchase of airplanes by Saudi Arabia that were to be used in a GCC early warning air system, and the announcement of the purchase of a radar early warning system.

GCC security policy was inward focusing because of the threat of spillover from the Iran-Iraq war. The GCC member nations' military policy was also primarily interested in coordination that could assist all members as rapidly as possible given the resources available. The GCC was positioning itself as adhering to Arab League principles of self-reliance. The need to maintain a non-aligned status in this conflict-ridden region was deemed the more prudent and cautious option for the GCC given the resources available to both Iran and Iraq.

It is possible to see the opportunities and constraints placed on the GCC in its attempt to provide both security and military resources under the auspices of a regional organization.

Hypothesis and Security Outcome Results

A review of the results with regard to the second stated hypothesis is given below.

The hypothesis states;

H2: The GCC, in its concern for stability, will be more active in security issue area outcomes at the domestic and regional levels.

As noted in chapter 1 this hypothesis makes sense when the conflict in the region is considered. Between 1981 and 1994 the organization witnessed regional conflicts that included the Iranian revolution, the Soviet Union's intervention in Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. These conflicts caused concern in the GCC nations because of the high number of migrant workers in all the member states, and the large Shi'a communities in the northern Gulf states that were known to express religious and political differences through domestic unrest.

The results show that the GCC security event outcomes were centered at the domestic level with 58.3% or 206 outcomes. From the two scales it is possible to note that the level of diplomatic acts was in the mid-range with the category of talks and meetings with 51% or 105 outcomes; and treaties and agreements with 29.1% or 60 outcomes reflecting a GCC concern for domestic security. However, results on the level of satisfaction scale mute the overall results because, 47.6% or 98 outcomes were in the

neutral, or further study category and only 44.2% or 91 were in the success category. The higher number of outcomes at the domestic level in the further study category can be attributed to discussion and study of the military and security agreements the GCC were attempting to implement. The agreements affected national sovereignty on security and military matters and therefore further research and clarification were often needed. This was apparent with the joint security agreement and Kuwait's disagreement over the pursuit of criminals across national borders. Therefore the GCC was more concerned with security and military matters at the domestic level, but related issues of national sovereignty required further study.

The regional level of security outcomes was the second largest category with 30.9% or 109 outcomes. Results indicate that 57.8% or 63 outcomes were in the success category but that the level of diplomatic acts were in the talks and meetings category with 61.5% or 67; and 28.4% or 31 were in the verbal statements category. Therefore the GCC gained greater success on this level but at a lower diplomatic level and overall number of outcomes.

The data therefore suggest that the GCC was more interested in domestic security issues rather than regional security issues. There was greater concern over domestic security and the viability of the member nations with regard to regional threats and internal unrest. For the GCC to continue as a valid entity meant the security and stability of its members had to be addressed first. The organization provided greater benefits to its members because under the military and joint security agreements a member nation

threatened meant a threat to all members and thus greater resources were available in regional situations. A greater sense of the external factors affecting the domestic level is given below.

External factors

As noted, external factors affected the establishment of the GCC. The Iranian revolution, the Soviet Union invading Afghanistan, and the Iran-Iraq war were regional conflicts occurring within the space of three years. The danger that external might destabilize members in ideological or political terms was very real to the GCC states.

Member nations understood that on military and security matters the benefits of belonging to a RIGO were considerable. They were able to share information, coordinate policy, gain consensus on regional security policy and plans, enact and begin implementation of both security and military agreements and establish early warning defense systems.

The leadership were quick to enact a military policy that emphasized GCC responsibility for Gulf security. The GCC forces were technically established as a defensive measure. Non-alignment was important to the GCC as was the emphasis of the Peninsula Shield Force (PSF) as a protectionist measure.

This was because the GCC did not want overt superpower involvement in the Gulf area because they believed this would expand the focus of the Iran-Iraq war. Their

judicious use of Arab League principles was to appease not only other Arab nations but also Iraq and Iran who were fighting an eight year war in the immediate vicinity.

The GCC was established to promote regional integration primarily through economic affairs. Although it is never expressly stated in the Charter, the security of the member states, and therefore the organization, and the region via military methods was also very important. To achieve regional cooperation via the economic sphere meant the GCC must be able to trade in a secure environment. The leadership recognized that to attain regional cooperation and integration, the domestic security infrastructure needed to be coordinated more fully. This would give the GCC nations' an understanding of the complete security policy they needed to adopt and the level of coordination required of each nation. Once these systems were implemented, the organization and its members would have the political and security means to protect and improve their economic resources.

Internal factors

Strong support was provided to the GCC on military and security issues from the Supreme and Ministerial levels. The chiefs of staff formed both the security and military agreements and endorsement at the ministerial and leadership levels was quickly forthcoming. Again the similar political structure and leadership allowed the GCC to achieve a mid-to high-level success in regional cooperation. The range of issues involved security and military agreements, military coordination, security coordination, information

sharing, and military assistance by all member states if a member was threatened or attacked. The concern was to improve domestic security so that military coordination could then play a role in effective protection of the Gulf region. The improved domestic situation would also assist the internal security of the member states so they could share information, conduct training and coordinate against perceived external threats.

Political militancy and religious extremism are especial concerns to the GCC leadership and the latter was a catalyst to information sharing among the GCC states beginning in 1981. The threat in 1981 was from Iran's version of Islamic fundamentalism. The GCC member states with larger Shi'a populations were concerned about the export of this ideology and therefore willingly shared information under the GCC joint security agreement.

Theoretical Significance of the Security Outcomes

The theoretical relevance of the security issue area outcomes of the study is depicted by the significance of the external factors in producing GCC foreign policy outcomes. The arena of security issues also portrayed consensus by members on its foreign policy outcomes. For security and military frameworks to succeed consensus is paramount and for the most part this was achieved by the GCC. The chiefs of staff were able to gain support for the agreements and achieved positive results early on. Both reasons given for regional cooperation are apparent in the GCC's security issue area outcomes. Again the organization's political structure and thus its procedural and

substantive consensus provide a framework for both opportunities and constraints. Because of the political leadership the organization had a procedural structure in place and consensus on substantive issues in operation very quickly. (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff 1990, 431). Also the presence or threat of force was a catalyst for establishing the GCC from a security perspective. The implications of regional conflicts had an effect on the member nation's domestic security and state of readiness. (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff 1990,431).

Consensus was also achieved on security outcomes at the regional and international levels though the type of issue action was at a lower level, confined to talks and discussions on military trade issues or the Damascus Declaration. The Secretary General announced in several press interviews that the members were free to choose their own defensive capabilities and these would only help to enhance the GCC in its security strategy. In other words the GCC nations had the freedom to choose their own national military policy that would fit under the GCC military agreement. As long as the nations were able to meet their GCC obligations the leadership decided unilateral agreements and diversification would be allowed.

The GCC utilized the five points Karns and Mingst (1987, 468-469) raised regarding reasons why states may join IGOs. The members understood that "interest aggregation and collective influence" (Karns and Mingst 1987, 468) are necessary. In this case they had to publicly reiterate their policy on Gulf security and emphasize that no

regional or international powers would be involved. This non-aligned policy, an exercise in diplomatic fence-sitting, worked until the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

The GCC was used as a “vehicle for collective legitimization of their foreign policy actions and the downplaying of other foreign policy actions by other organizations or nations” (Karns and Mingst 1987, 468). Examples are again the GCC Gulf security policy under the GCC military agreement, and the downplaying of Arab criticism of the continued presence of US bases in the Gulf.

The GCC “created international public policy” with its stance on regional security but was more successful at providing a “framework for multilateral cooperation on different issue areas” (Karns and Mingst 1987, 468-469). This can be seen in its coordination of domestic military and security policy and the agreement by the GCC leadership to allow the member nations greater independence in deciding their national military strategies.

They also “enhanced opportunities” for GCC states “to exercise influence in issue areas and organizations” (Karns and Mingst 1987, 468-469). This was noticeable in security talks with Iran over regional defense policy, and in an unexpected way regarding the Damascus Declaration’s security aspects.

Karns and Mingst's final point shows the GCC “provided opportunities for bilateral and multilateral discussion between member states” (1987, 469) and by GCC nations and other nations. Bilateral and multilateral opportunities were prominent at the domestic level with regard to both the joint security agreement and the military agreement. The member

nations were able to share information and coordinate policy on these agreements. Military exercises were organized by members on a smaller scale after the first two PSF exercises and military assistance was given to the Oman for defense of the Hormuz Strait and to Bahrain for improving their air defense and early warning system.

Again, the GCC foreign policy outcomes at the domestic, regional and international levels show the substantive and procedural structure still need work. This is particularly noticeable in the implementation of the joint security and military agreements.

Cooperation within the GCC is apparent because the member states have adapted “their behavior to the needs of others by means of a process of policy coordination,” (Dougherty & Pfalzgraff 1990,170), but greater influence needs to be exerted internally for member nations to adopt all parts of the security and military agreements because national sovereignty issues still hamper implementation. The leadership approve and support the agreements but still want the ability to operate as independent member states. This has meant the GCC cannot achieve any real level of systemization in the PSF forces and had to announce the adoption of the policy of diversification.

Security issue area outcomes provided opportunities and constraints for the GCC. External factors greatly affected the domestic policy of the member states and led to the military and security agreements. Internally the leaders realized this was the best way to achieve a sense of security and stability. At the same time the leadership was wary of introducing too much coordination in the security or military policy as this could be a threat to both national sovereignty and national security.

Conclusion

The organization has received continued support from the leadership on security issues. The leadership understand that the GCC presents real opportunities for a level of coordination by the member nations on security and military matters. Security for the member states and the region is tied to GCC policy and their ability to stand behind their word with decisive action.

In Chapter 5 a discussion of the GCC political issue area outcomes is introduced. A discussion of the results and their theoretical significance with regard to the third hypothesis and the literature is described. This is the third of the GCC issue areas in this study.

CHAPTER 5

POLITICAL ISSUE AREA RESULTS FOR THE GCC

Introduction

This chapter discusses the GCC political issue area for the study period 1981-1994. The political issue area incorporates events that include discussion on, and agreements pertaining to diplomatic relations; domestic, regional, or international talks; treaties; cultural and social issues; and regional and international organizations. "The political-diplomatic issue area covers the spectrum of foreign policy interaction to each of the three levels of the external environment -..." (Gallhofer & Saris 1996, 179).

As before, the three levels of analysis are the domestic, consisting of GCC nations; the regional, consisting of countries and organizations in the Middle East; and the international, consisting of countries and organizations in the rest of the world.

Two scales are used to determine if the GCC provided a forum for regional cooperation. The first scale is level of success, the second is level of diplomatic acts. Level of success is an evaluation of the outcomes from the perspective of the GCC. Outcomes were coded; satisfied, or success, neutral, or further study, and not satisfied, or no success. This scaling is used to judge the success rate of GCC outcomes by level and issue area. Level of diplomatic acts is a scaling used to depict the political energy expended by the GCC on issue area outcomes. The categories for this scale are, from low to high;

verbal statements, talks and meetings, treaties and agreements, and aid, assistance, or sanctions. Thus, two scales are used; level of success, and level of diplomatic acts, to evaluate the regional cooperation ability of the GCC with regard to political issue area outcomes.


Results

The overall results show that the GCC's interest in political issues occupied 52.8% or 725 out of 1372 total outcomes coded. The regional level was the largest category coded with 47.2% or 342 outcomes. The domestic level was next with 36.3% or 263 outcomes and the international level had 16.5% or 120 political issue area outcomes. This trend remained consistent throughout the study period of 1981-1994.

With respect to the GCC issue types, the most common were; procedural GCC issues, with 37.4% or 271; regional talks, with 27.6% or 200; and international talks, and treaties and agreements, with 9% or 65 each.

Figure 5.1

Political Issue Area Outcomes for the GCC 1981-1994



The graph depicts the total number of political issue area outcomes for each year of the study period from 1981-1994 and the chronology of these political event outcomes is detailed below.

Chronology of Political Outcome Results

The first year of the GCC, 1981, reflected the business of creating a new organization. Table 5.2 shows the political issue area outcomes for the three largest categories for each year of the study period. The largest category of issue area types was procedural GCC issues with 53% or 33 of 62. This was followed by 12.9% or 8 for both regional talks, and treaties and agreements. In 1982 the largest category of political issues was regional talks, with 46% or 29 of 63; then domestic talks, with 17.5% or 11; and

procedural issues, with 15.9% or 10. With the exception of 1991 the first four years of the GCC saw the largest amount of political outcomes with 62 in 1981, 63 in 1982, 73 in 1983 and 70 in 1984. This can be attributed to the establishment of the organization and to concern over regional issues. The year 1991 saw an increase in political outcomes with 61 because of the Kuwait conflict.

In 1983 regional talks, with 32.9% or 24 of 73 was again the largest category; followed by procedural issues, with 30% or 22; and diplomatic relations, with 15% or 11. In 1984 the issues were more varied. Procedural issues was the largest with 48.6% or 34 of 70; treaties and agreements, with 12.9% or 9 was next; and regional talks, with 11.4% or 8 was third. The outcomes reflect the diplomatic pressure the GCC was implementing at the UN with regard to the Tanker war.

Table 5.2

Annual Political Issues for 1981-1994

Year	Category 1	Category 2	Category 3
1981	procedural issues 53% 33/62	regional talks*, treaties* 12.9% 12.9% 8 8	
1982	regional talks 46 29/63	domestic talks 17.5 11	procedural issues 15.9 10
1983	regional talks 32.9 24/73	procedural issues 30 22	diplomatic relations 15 11
1984	procedural issues 48.6 34/70	treaties 12.9 9	regional talks 11.8 8

1985	procedural issues 56.4 31/55	diplomatic relations 16.4 9	regional talks 10.9 6
1986	procedural issues 41.9 18/43	regional talks*, social issues* 16.3 7	16.3 7
1987	procedural issues 54.5 18/33	regional talks 24.2 8	social issues 12.1 4
1988	regional talks 50 20/40	procedural issues 27.5 11	diplomatic relations 12.5 5
1989	procedural issues 37 17/46	regional talks 34.8 16	int'l talks 13 6
1990	procedural issues 45.8 22/48	regional talks 27.1 13	int'l talks 14.6 7
1991	regional talks 31.1 19/61	procedural issues 27.9 17	int'l talks*, treaties* 19.7 12
1992	procedural issues 32.6 15/46	treaties 28 10	regional talks 19.6 9
1993	regional talks 43.2 19/44	procedural issues 20.5 9	treaties 15.9 7
1994	procedural issues*, regional talks* 32.6 14/43	32.6 14	int'l talks 16.3 7

KEY: procedural issues, regional talks, treaties and agreements, international talks, diplomatic relations, cultural/social issues, domestic talks. * = tied categories.

Procedural issues was again the largest category in 1985 with 56.4% or 31 of 55; diplomatic relations, was next with 16.4% or 9; and regional talks, with 10.9% or 6 was third. Indeed this trend continued through 1990 with the exception of 1988 when regional talks was largest. In 1986, 41.9% or 18 of 43 political issues were procedural issues; with regional talks and cultural and social issues with 16.3% or 7 outcomes each. 1987 saw 54.5% or 18 of 33 as procedural issues; 24.2% or 8 as regional talks; and 12.1% or 4 as cultural and social issues. The pattern altered in 1988 with regional talks the largest category with 50% or 20 of 40 issue type outcomes; procedural issues with 27.5% or 11; and diplomatic relations with 12.5% or 5. Regional and procedural issues occupied similar amounts of attention in 1989 with procedural issues having 37% or 17 of 46; and regional talks with 34.8% or 16; and international talks, the third category with 13% or 6 issue type outcomes. Again in 1990 these three categories were the largest with procedural issues with 45.8% or 22 of 48; regional talks with 27.1% or 13; and international talks with 14.6% or 7.

This pattern was repeated in 1991 but with regional talks with 31.1% or 19 of 61 outcomes; procedural issues with 27.9% or 17; and international talks and treaties and agreements with 19.7% or 12 outcomes each. Event outcomes clustered in these categories because of factors surrounding the invasion of Kuwait and also the Damascus Declaration.

The years 1992 through 1994 saw the total event outcomes counts drop again. The largest categories for 1992 were; procedural issues, with 32.6% or 15 of 46; treaties

and agreements, with 28% or 10; and regional talks, with 19.6% or 9. For 1993 issue type outcomes centered on regional talks, with 43.2% or 19 of 44; procedural issues, with 20.5% or 9; and treaties and agreements, with 15.9% or 7. In 1994 procedural issues and regional talks both had the same amount of issue type outcomes with 32.6% or 14 of 43 outcomes each; followed by international talks, with 16.3% or 7.

There is a consistent trend over the 14-year period, in particular that two issue types, regional talks and procedural issues are among the top three categories for every year. These are regional talks, and procedural issues. This reveals the GCC's interest in regional level outcomes in the political arena. International talks and treaties and agreements also appear as important categories. An analysis of the results by the domestic, regional, and international levels will permit a clearer understanding of particular issues, and the level of success and political energy expended by the GCC.

Domestic Level

The GCC produced 263 domestic political outcomes during the period studied. Table 5.3 shows that for domestic political outcomes 38% or 100 of 263 outcomes were successes; 52.1% or 137 were in the neutral, or further study category; and 9.9% or 26 were not successes. Therefore the largest category with more than 50% is further study. This result is consistent with theoretical discussions and further explanation of the domestic level outcomes.

As to the level of diplomatic acts, Table 5.4 shows that 66.1% or 174 outcomes of 263 produced talks and meetings, 21.7% or 57 resulted in treaties and agreements, and 12.2% or 32 in verbal statements. None resulted in aid or sanctions.

Table 5.3

Level of Success of Domestic Political Outcomes

Success level	Number	%
success	100	38
neutral	137	52.1
no success	26	9.9
Total	263	100

The results of the second scale show political outcomes occurred at the mid to high range with talks and meetings the largest category and treaties and agreements second. Thus the GCC was concerned about the political outcomes at the domestic level but as the results show, both talks and agreements generally resulted in further study and discussion. This is understandable because issues of national sovereignty arise in most of the domestic political outcomes. Meetings regarding the implementation of shari'a judicial law, the discussion of visas and the movement of Gulf nationals, and GCC passports are all examples of such issues.

In 1981 the GCC was established. Issues addressed at the domestic level for the first five years included GCC procedural legislation establishing the organization; treaties concluded by the GCC, including internal treaties between the GCC member nations; and

cultural and social issues. An example of the latter was discussion on moving the Voice of the GCC radio broadcasts every three months; and judicial matters, for example, a common shari'a law for the GCC and its member nations and the implementation of the new code in all branches of law.

Table 5.4

Level of Diplomatic Acts of Domestic Political Outcomes

Diplomatic acts	Number	%
verbal	32	12.2
talks	174	66.1
treaties	57	21.7
aid	0	
Total	263	100

Event outcomes at the domestic level also centered on the movement of nationals within the GCC. Both the issues of GCC passports and the movement of gulf nationals were part of the UEA stage I approved by the GCC leadership. However, the organization was finding it difficult to implement these points because of certain aspects of national sovereignty. This also meant action on the two issues did not occur at the same levels in all six countries. Also the movement of GCC nationals between the member nations was only limited to particular jobs or professions.

Another important domestic issue was diplomatic relations between member nations primarily with regard to mediation in border disputes. An example of the latter is the Bahrain-Qatar dispute over the Hawar Islands which flared in 1983 and 1988. The

dispute is still unresolved and was ultimately sent to the International Court of Justice in the Hague, Netherlands. Mediation and negotiation are deemed political matters once particular aspects of the issue are settled and it becomes apparent that diplomacy is the more important emphasis.

One real threat to the equanimity of the GCC was Qatar's threat not to attend the 1992 summit conference, and its public threat to leave the organization. Dissent at this level was unheard of until this time. The cause of such a highly public rift was a border dispute with Saudi Arabia that was settled at the eleventh hour with Qatar attending the summit meeting.

Regional Level

Once the organization's structure and procedural legislation were established the general focus turned toward the regional level even though the category of procedural issues remained great during the study period. Regional political outcomes were the most numerous category with respect to political outcomes for the study period 1981-1994. There were a total of 47.2% or 342 political outcomes at the regional level.

External regional factors played a significant role in this respect - especially the Iran-Iraq war, and the invasion of Kuwait. Other issues addressed at the regional level included the Damascus Declaration, mediation with Iran and Iraq over ending the war, talks with Iran over the occupation of the Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa islands, mediation talks with Syria regarding Lebanon, the Arab-Israeli conflict and the Palestinians,

diplomatic relations between Oman and People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, mediation between the two Yemens during the civil war, and Arab League discussions.

Table 5.5, breaks down political outcomes by success level. Most political outcomes were in the success category (51.8%) while the neutral category had 40.9% and 7.3% or 25 were no successes.

Table 5.5

Level of Success of Regional Political Outcomes

Success level	Number	%
success	177	51.8
neutral	140	40.9
no success	25	7.3
Total	342	100

In Table 5.6 the most frequent regional political outcome is talks and meetings (70.5% or 241 outcomes), followed by verbal statements (17.3%) and treaties and agreements (12%). Thus the majority of outcomes occurred at the low to mid range of the diplomatic scale with almost three-quarters of the political outcomes at the talks and meetings level. Of these outcomes just over half were successes and the remainder in the neutral or further study category.

The regional level category had the most political outcomes of all three levels and the majority of the outcomes were at the talks level. Obviously political diplomacy was important to the GCC and they were able to achieve a degree of success. But it is

noticeable that the GCC was using meetings and verbal expressions of support at the regional level to enable the GCC to be active under Arab League principles and to express interest in assisting with other Arab problems at this level. The GCC also had to appease larger regional neighbors Iraq and Iran. This set of constraints gave the GCC the difficult task of being many things to many regional interests. Talks and assistance with mediation in the complex and well documented Middle East problems beset the GCC. Particularly difficult were its attempts to end the Iran-Iraq war. Assistance in some of these political issues by mediation attempts was common but mainly more usual were expressions of support at ministerial and summit level conferences and GCC leadership press conferences. The organization also attempted to promote a spirit of Arab cooperation and unity so these problems could finally be solved. At this time the Arab League was rife with divisions that were creating difficulties in finding solutions to the many Arab conflicts.

Table 5.6

Level of Diplomatic Acts of Regional Political Outcomes

Diplomatic acts	Number	%
verbal	59	17.2
talks	241	70.5
treaties	41	12
aid	1	0.3
Total	342	100

International Level Political Outcomes

International political outcomes did not figure prominently for the GCC. There were 120 political outcomes at this level, the same number as in the economic category. Table 5.7 shows that 54.2% or 65 of the outcomes were in the success category; 38.3% or 46 were in the neutral or further study category; and 7.5% or 9 outcomes were in the no success category.

Table 5.7

Level of Success of International Level Political Outcomes

Success level	Number	%
success	65	54.2
neutral	46	38.3
no success	9	7.5
Total	120	100

On the level of diplomatic acts scale, depicted in Table 5.8, 71.7% or 86 of the outcomes were in meetings and talks; with 15.8% or 19 in verbal statements, and 12.5% or 15 in the treaties and agreements category. There were no outcomes recorded in the aid and sanctions category.

Table 5.8

Level of Diplomatic Acts of International Level Political Outcomes

Diplomatic acts	Number	%
verbal	19	15.8
talks	86	71.7
treaties	15	12.5
aid	0	0
Total	120	100

These results show that at the international level the GCC conducted itself at the mid to low range of diplomacy and most outcomes achieved success or further study. Within the full range of GCC business, events at the international level were the least commonly dealt with. Despite their relative infrequency, the GCC had some notable international successes. These included GCC lobbying at the United Nations (UN) with regard to the Tanker war in 1984 and the invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Thus international events mainly centered on the Iran-Iraq war and the invasion of Kuwait. Other international issues included the Madrid Peace Conference and discussions with the EC over the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Hypothesis and the GCC Political Outcomes

The third and final hypothesis states:

H3: GCC political foreign policy outcomes will be more prevalent at the regional level.

The reasoning posited for this result is that the GCC wishes to maintain stability in the region so that it can continue its economic development and provide security for its populace. The GCC is therefore expected to be a willing participant in regional politics, thus promoting cooperation and unity so that regional problems can be solved and the status quo maintained.

The results show this is indeed the case with 342 political outcomes or 47.2% at this level, with 263 or 36.3% at the domestic level, and 120 or 16.5% of political outcomes at the international level. It is apparent the GCC attempted to participate in regional politics so that with diplomatic acts it could attempt to promote unity and maintain stability as much as possible. In this case it seems the GCC was trying “to cultivate the goodwill of the larger powers,” (Papadakis and Starr 1987, 429).

In coding the outcomes it was noticeable by the earlier outcomes verbally stated, primarily to the other Arab nations, that the GCC was established under the principles and framework of the Arab League. On several occasions GCC leaders expressed Arab unity and brotherhood to fend off criticism from other Arab nations who saw the organization as a grouping of conservative oil-rich states intent on distancing themselves from the rest of the Arab world. The GCC showed this was not the case by assisting in mediation efforts in Lebanon, support for the Palestinians, and mediation attempts with Iran to end the Iran-Iraq war.

External Factors

The study amply depicts the effects of external factors on GCC political foreign policy outcomes. The GCC had to fend off Arab criticism and show their intention to promote the principles of the Arab League and regional cooperation. There were assurances of continued support for Arab issues at every meeting held at the Ministerial or Supreme council level. There were also verbal expressions of support for the Palestinian people and the intifada and calls for a solution to the occupied territories and an end to "Israeli oppression."

The GCC placed itself in the Arab headlines as much as possible. At first this seems to have been a promotion and appeasement exercise to show the Arab world that things would not change. One of the main concerns of the Arab nations was the possible decrease in aid by GCC member nations.

As noted above, the threat of spillover into GCC nations by the ideological views of the Iranian revolution and the potential for the Iran-Iraq war to spread were reasons for the organization's establishment. The GCC leadership realized that external factors could affect national stability and security and their economic resources. To prevent possible problems the six member states established the GCC to promote political-diplomatic action to protect their common interests. They believed that greater success would be achieved in foreign policy through the framework of the RIGO.

Internal Factors

Internal factors allowed the organization a high level of leadership support. The member nations and the GCC are leadership driven. These nations have authoritarian rule in a traditional hierarchic style and there is little popular input into political decisions. Their leaders cooperation within the GCC is, therefore, little constrained by popular pressures.

The benefits of such a structure is that the GCC could attend international and regional meetings with a GCC position all six members had agreed upon. The GCC generally achieved internal consensus on political outcomes. The organization realized it was important to show a united front because the member states were facing damaging economic and military effects from the Iran-Iraq war. They had to decide as a group what action to take on foreign policy realizing the future of the organization and the member states was precariously balanced. But internal dissensus was apparent on Kuwait's policy of reflagging its shipping and the decision to allow non-GCC forces to use GCC nations as bases and assist in the liberation of Kuwait. Indeed, the dissensus occurred despite the fact that external bases and forces constituted the only realistic option available.

The GCC showed that its internal factors - its political structures - could achieve rapid results on issues of great importance to the organization. Examples are the international successes of the GCC. These were primarily centered on obtaining United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions on the tanker war and shipping in international waters, and the invasion of Kuwait.

Theoretical Significance of the Political Outcomes

The members' domestic political structures and the GCC structures have enabled the organization to achieve procedural and substantive consensus. This is apparent in the political issue area results and corroborates the first of the two views on integration discussed by Dougherty and Pfalzgraff (1990). The second view on integration is also relevant to the GCC. The presence, or threat of force from external regional factors, was the reason for the GCC states' cooperation and the establishment of the organization (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff 1990, 431).

Indeed cooperation has occurred in the GCC and it is apparent because the member states have adapted "their behavior to the needs of others by means of a process of policy coordination." (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff 1990, 170). In the case of the GCC, cooperation occurred in "reaction to existing conflict" and, as "an effort to avoid future conflict," (Dougherty and Pfalzgraff 1990, 170).

As a grouping of small states they relied on tactics that are mentioned in small-state literature: they appealed to international organizations, focused attention on specific regional issues, and appealed to larger nations with regard to mutual interests. (Papadakis and Starr 1987, 426). There were successes in all issue areas but the particularly noticeable ones involved the UNSC resolutions the GCC gained with regard to the Tanker War and the invasion of Kuwait.

Another aspect of small state behavior that can be attributed to the organization is their attempt to maintain stability and security. Especially in the political issue area the

GCC “try to cultivate the goodwill of the larger powers,” (Papadakis and Starr 1987, 429). This is noticeable in verbal expressions on the establishment of the GCC under the auspices of Arab League principles and also their calls for Arab unity. They also tried to cultivate goodwill with Iran and Iraq and in other regional situations where member nations were used in mediations and negotiations. Security factors became part of foreign policy outcomes in the political issue area because of the GCC’s economic dependency on the petroleum industry and therefore the need to continue oil shipments.

The result of the interdependence of these factors meant that the GCC did several about faces on political outcomes. Examples were the Kuwaiti reflagging under US protection, and the multi-national forces liberating Kuwait. This flexibility in foreign policy has allowed the GCC longevity and continued operation even if dissension was apparent on these two events. The long-term goals of economic security and development were more important. Generally the GCC took more prudent and conservative approaches to political events whenever possible. They initiated a political policy that gave them diplomatic options with all sides in a situation. Thus although the GCC supported Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, primarily because of Arab “brotherhood,” mediation and relations with Iran were also available through member nations.

The results of the GCC foreign policy outcomes at the domestic, regional and international levels also show the substantive and procedural structure still needs support and work. Judicial and legal questions over the sovereignty of GCC legislation has delayed the implementation of a code of law based on shari’a law for all member states to use. The

main issue revolves around the role of the national judiciary particularly in civil, business and criminal law and the ultimate place of the GCC's shari'a law code.

Collective influence was adopted on UNSC resolutions, mediation policies with regard to the Iran-Iraq war, the border dispute between Bahrain and Qatar and diplomatic relations between Oman and PDR Yemen.

The GCC was a vehicle for “collective legitimization of their foreign policy actions and the downplaying of other foreign policy actions by other organizations or nations” (Karns and Mingst 1987, 468). Examples at the domestic level are internal meetings to gain a united stance on political outcomes, at the regional level the attempts to gain Arab unity so Middle East conflicts could be solved, mediation attempts by GCC and Arab League members in Lebanon, Iran and Yemen. At the international level examples include the UNSC resolutions the GCC gained on tanker shipping attacks during the Iran-Iraq war and also on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait.

The GCC created “international public policy and influenced other states' policies” with its actions regarding the Tanker war (Karns and Mingst 1987, 468). The issue was taken to the Arab League and gained support and then went to the UN where UNSC resolutions were gained. The influence on other states' policies enabled the resolutions but did not stop the attacks. At the regional level the GCC continued to try to bring the Arab League nations together so that issues such as Lebanon, the Palestinian intifada and the other aspects of the Arab-Israeli conflict might achieve concrete results.

The GCC also “provided a framework for multilateral cooperation in different political issue areas” (Karns and Mingst 1987, 468-469). An example of this was discussion on the Palestinian-Israel peace process and the talks with the EC on the process. Arab League members asked the GCC to lobby the US and EC to gain support at the international level so the talks could move forward. The organization “enhanced opportunities for different GCC states to exercise influence in political issue areas and organizations” by involving member states in various mediation efforts (Karns and Mingst 1987, 468-469). At the domestic level, Saudi Arabia mediated troop withdrawals by Qatar from the Hawar Islands the islands at the center of the border dispute between Bahrain and Qatar. A tripartite committee was also established to resolve the issue. At the regional level the GCC exercised influence in various mediation roles. Member states assisted in mediation talks on diplomatic relations between Oman and PDR Yemen, Lebanon, and Iran. At the international level Kuwait and Saudi Arabia exercised influence in talks at the UN and with the EC on Middle East issues including the Tanker War, Kuwait invasion and Palestinian-Israeli peace talks.

Finally, the GCC “provided opportunities for bilateral and multilateral discussion” between member states and also between GCC nations and other nations (Karns and Mingst 1987, 469). At the domestic level the GCC enabled Bahrain and Qatar to discuss the border dispute through the Tripartite committee. Ultimately Qatar took the dispute to the International Court of Justice in the Hague. Multilateral discussion at this level occurred on the establishment of the GCC and agreements to continue the radio station

broadcasts by Voice of the Gulf. At the regional level the GCC enabled the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDR Yemen) and Oman to establish diplomatic relations and also attempted to establish useful mediation between Iran and the UAE over Lesser Tunbs and Abu Musa. At the international level talks between the GCC and the EC on the Palestinian issue and attendance at the Madrid Peace conference allowed the GCC to continue a role in Arab politics at the international level.

It is interesting to note that on political issues several GCC member nations were part of mediation efforts. The UAE and Qatar were most often used, for example, in discussions on peace in the Lebanon, the island dispute with Iran, the end to the Iran-Iraq war, and the Yemen civil war. Saudi Arabia also figured in mediations but generally was a nation behind the scenes in the GCC. As an individual nation they were more involved in organizing the annual Haj, held the leadership of the Islamic Conference for a time and occupied a prominent position in OPEC as the swing producer.

A RIGO has the ability to create opportunities for member nations and at the same time constrain actions of its members. In the case of political issues the GCC states were more than willing to support the organization and publicly promote its autonomy. Several meetings were called at the ministerial level before external regional meetings so the foreign ministers could gain consensus on an issue and present a GCC position at the regional or international level. An example was the discussion and approval of the Saudi peace plan for Lebanon when Saudi Arabia was Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) president. Indeed political events moved the foreign ministers to call extraordinary

meetings on several occasions, such as on the Bahrain Qatar dispute, the Iran-Iraq war, and the invasion of Kuwait.

The GCC was able to garner a modest level of achievement in the political arena during the fourteen years, obtaining international and regional support when vital, but mostly lending support by verbal actions or involvement in talks and meetings.

Much of the political work involved ongoing events which took several years to resolve, such as the Iran-Iraq war. GCC policy during this war unfolded over a period of nine years, and the repercussions of the invasion of Kuwait still continue with Iraq under international sanctions. The GCC was able to muster continued support by member leadership. The viability of the organization depends on continued support at the ministerial and leadership levels. Indeed dissent was only apparent publicly in 1992 when Qatar threatened non-attendance at the Supreme Council meeting. Because of a border dispute with Saudi Arabia they had not participated in ministerial and bureaucratic level talks on the upcoming conference. The border dispute was resolved at the last minute and Qatar attended the summit. With this exception support has been continuous over the years which is no surprise considering the political structure of the organization. While theory and practice can be very different, here we see a RIGO able to carry out its charter principles and gain foreign policy consensus when needed. -

The GCC is hampered by external and internal constraints -- the small size of their nations, their limited resources, and wars among their regional neighbours for the whole of the 1980s. Also, internal economies suffered in the mid 1980's with the drop in oil prices,

which resulted in budget deficits. Then after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, capital was used to rebuild Kuwait and economies were still recovering from the Iran-Iraq war. Oil prices improved to some extent but economic development is slow and governments and leaders now face an educated, expanding population calling for greater political representation. Unemployment rates are increasing and domestic political level concerns will require concerted action by the GCC to prevent domestic disintegration.

Conclusion

The majority of the GCC's attention was focused on regional issues. This is understandable given the first eight years of the organizations life was concerned with implications of the Iran- Iraq war. The organization showed it was able to operate a diplomacy that deflected most Arab criticism and stressed non-alignment.

The GCC highlighted the problems that small nations face when executing foreign policy be it, proactive or reactive in nature. They achieved a measure of success with regional and international recognition but these results were hampered by the limited resources available to the GCC and the fact the organization had to operate conservatively and cautiously being all things to all nations and organizations.

Chapter 6 concludes the discussion of the study. It relates the theoretical significance of small state membership in RIGOs, internal and external factors affecting membership and an evaluation of the hypotheses. Implications for future research are also discussed.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION

This study contributes a longitudinal analysis of the first fourteen years of the GCC to Middle Eastern foreign policy behavior research. Even after a decade and a half of the GCC's existence, information on the institution has remained sparse. The longest studies undertaken previously covered five years (Ramazani 1988) and seven years (E. Peterson 1988) and were largely descriptive in nature. This study has not only extended the period examined, but also has recorded and examined data on multiple issue areas and levels of analysis.

From an available total of 1174 reports on the GCC in the FBIS-Near East and South Asia daily reports, 1372 event outcomes were coded for the 14-year time period. This data set is the first known attempt to accumulate a complete longitudinal record of GCC outcomes. The study used such reported sources as charters, resolutions and agreements; notifications, statements or communiques; speeches or interviews by GCC representatives; and mass media reports from English or Arabic language media.

The creation of the data set enables future studies to continue a longitudinal record of the organization, focus on specific aspects of the GCC such as an issue area, a level of analysis, or particular outcome acts or success. It also contributes to area studies by providing a platform for future studies of the GCC or further data collection.

The study represents an attempt to understand a RIGO of developing nations, whereas most studies of such organizations have been of developed nations, primarily the European Community. Factors analyzed for the GCC such as, its members consisting of similar sized nations, dependent on oil exports, similar political structures, similar domestic factors and geographical proximity, help explain the longevity of the GCC and also its continued attempts at regional cooperation in economic, security and political issue areas.

Unlike many other works, the study applies a longitudinal, multi-level and multi-issue framework with the intent of depicting patterns over time for a RIGO concerned with several issue areas. The following discussion presents the main findings and a summary of these results with regard to the hypotheses, issue area and level of analysis.

Hypotheses

The study confirmed the three main hypotheses proposed in chapter one. The three hypotheses are as follows:

H1: The GCC will be more active in economic issue area outcomes at the domestic or international level;

H2: The GCC, in its concern for stability, will be more active in security issue area outcomes at the domestic and regional levels;

and

H3: GCC diplomatic foreign policy outcomes will be more prevalent at the regional level.

Economic hypothesis

The reasoning behind the first hypothesis is that the GCC would show an interest on these levels because it is dependent on the international markets for its oil and petrochemical sales. The outcome results showed this to be true and verified the hypothesis and propositions put forward by several scholars including East (1975) who noted small states are concerned with economic issues, and Reid who also noted that "The major hypothesis that can be made about microstate participation in international affairs is that participation will be based predominantly on economic issues," (1974, 30). Reid was writing about Caribbean nations who are also dependent on international markets for the sale of their primary commodities.

The GCC's economic issues are 51.4% at the domestic level and 40.8% at the international level. The regional level accounted for only 7.8%. Therefore the economic results clearly depict an interest in economic outcomes at the domestic and international levels.

The findings show that the economic value of the GCC to its member states at the domestic and international levels is in line with the IGO theory which states that small nations join these organizations in an attempt to improve opportunities and benefits. The GCC's members are dependent on a single industry and natural resource that is sold on the international market. Therefore there is an understandable linkage between the domestic and international levels in this issue area.

Security hypothesis

The second hypothesis was formulated to reflect the volatility of the region and a consensus that external threats would concern the GCC because of the threat of spillover. Results show that 58.3% of the outcomes were indeed at the domestic level, therefore the focus was on security the GCC could implement. Other security outcomes were 30.9% at the regional level and 10.8% at the international level.

Because of the size of the member nations and their lack of resources and military capabilities, domestic security concerns loomed large. National survival was at stake, especially with Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and there was great concern over regional conflicts. The similar political structures and regimes and the implementation of most aspects of the joint security and military agreements allowed the GCC some stability.

Both agreements were designed to prevent or neutralize domestic and external threats, and focused on the overwhelming external regional factors that served as a catalyst for the organization's establishment. At the same time the agreements drawn up were limited by national considerations and the Arab League principles of self-sufficiency and independence. Thus verification of this hypothesis occurred for the domestic level but not the regional level.

Leadership realized that a level of consensus and coordination was important. External factors made this possible but again, even with strong leadership support for the idea of a RIGO, national sovereignty and national security were particular concerns the GCC also had to address. Political diplomacy became a much used tool at all levels.

Political hypothesis

The third hypothesis was based on the assumption that the GCC wanted stability in the region for political and economic security. To implement this the GCC was a willing participant in regional politics, promoting cooperation so that regional conflicts could be solved and the status quo maintained. The results for this issue area show the regional level had the greatest number of political outcomes with 47.2%. The domestic level was second with 36.3% and the international level third with 16.5% of the political outcomes. The outcome results verify this hypothesis with the GCC's interest most obvious at the regional level of the political issue area.

The organization's diplomatic tools were put to full use to deflect Arab criticism of the new regional organization, to attempt mediation to end the Iran-Iraq war and other regional conflicts, and to forge diplomatic relations and end border disputes. Similar political structures and consensus among the leadership enabled the GCC to present organizational decisions on regional issues and apply diplomatic influence that attempted to promote Arab unity so regional conflicts could be solved quickly.

The GCC did indeed promote itself at the regional level as an organization concerned with Arab League principles and intent on promoting Arab cooperation to solve the Middle East conflicts. The result of this was a dual foreign policy agenda with the GCC involved in regional issues and also attempting to defuse the Iran-Iraq war, which was a more apparent threat to its members.

The GCC was able to “appeal to world opinion,... focus attention on specific local issues and mobilize the resources and will to back policy,... and exert influence... on larger states by appealing to mutual interests,” (Papadakis and Starr 1987, 426). Therefore the GCC revealed itself to be a newly emerging regional entity that has achieved a modest degree of regional cooperation and is interested in all issue areas at all levels of analysis.

General Summary of Findings

One of the main findings of this study is that of the three issue areas the political area had the largest number of outcomes (52.8%). The reason for this is that the member nations' limited domestic resources, for example, small national populations, weak military forces, lack of skilled labor, limited infrastructure and dependency on one major industry, meant the GCC made efficient use of a variety of diplomatic tools from the very start. The GCC's states understood the importance of diplomacy and used it to maintain stability, promote goodwill, and make use of other small-state tactics to gain benefits at the regional and international levels. These included, appealing to international organizations, focusing on specific regional issues, and appealing to larger nations regarding mutual interests. (Papadakis and Starr 1987, 429).

The study also revealed that the security issue area was next with 25.7% of the total outcomes for the study period. External regional threats made security an important issue area for the organization particularly at the domestic level. The importance of the security issue area is because of the small size of the member nations and the regional

conflicts that occurred between 1981 and 1994. It is natural for nations of any size to be concerned about their continued existence and the GCC addressed both internal security and external security concerns as best as their resources would allow.

Another general finding was that the economic issue area was a close third to the security outcomes and reflected a measure of importance to the GCC. The organization was originally established as an economic entity but because of regional and international events the issue area was overcome by political and security considerations. The GCC realizes the importance of this issue area particularly as it relies on a single industry that is traded on the international markets. Therefore the international level greatly affects the domestic level, both on internal national policy making and GCC policy making.

Results by Level of Analysis

The findings by level of analysis show that the greatest number of outcomes were domestic (45.2%) followed by regional with 34.5%, and international (20.3%).

Domestic level

At the domestic level the largest number of outcomes occurred in the political issue area with 42.4% of the outcomes. This result is explained by the number of political outcomes generated in establishing the organization, further treaties and agreements on domestic level political issues such as: establishing a GCC shari'a law, discussions regarding visas, passports and the movement of GCC nationals between member nations, and diplomatic cultural issues. The results at the domestic level indicate that the issue area

outcomes were clustered within 10% of each other with the security issue area outcomes second largest at the domestic level with 33.2% of the outcomes and economic outcomes third with 24.4%.

Again security was important to the GCC because of regional threats. The major concerns at this level focused on implementing the joint security agreement and the GCC military agreement so that internal security and regional stability could be maintained. Economic issues were also important but primarily centered around the Unified Economic Agreement (UEA) and the attempts to establish both Stage I and Stage II of the agreement within a reasonable timeframe.

Regional Level

At the regional level, political issues were the most common (72.2%). The other issues were widely dispersed: security issues were second with 23% of the outcomes and the economic issue area was a distant third with 4.9%. Security at the regional level was seen by the GCC as an extension of the domestic concerns.

It should not be surprising that regional economic issues assumed third place. The GCC's Arab neighbours are poor and wanted financial assistance from the oil rich states. The GCC's economic aid was at a high point during the oil boom between 1973 and 1982. Throughout the 1980s and the 1990s, such assistance dwindled significantly. The low representation of the economic issue area at the regional level can also be explained by the low level of interstate trade among the Middle Eastern countries which does not exceed

5%. This is why the economic issue area at the domestic level is linked to the international level because the GCC's oil was traded on the international markets and the GCC's imports came mainly from the industrialized world.

The political issue area was greatest at the regional level because the GCC was positioning itself as a regional organization concerned with cooperation and unity under Arab League principles. The organization used its diplomatic tools to assist in solving regional Arab problems including the Iran-Iraq war. Because of the member nations' lack of resources and capabilities, the GCC realized early on that effective diplomacy and a role as a mediator would gain them advantages at the regional and international levels.

International Level

The majority of events at the international level occurred in the political and economic issue areas with each having 43.2%. The security issue area was third with 13.7% of the outcomes.

Again, as previously stated the GCC's economic development is closely linked to the international level because of its dependence on oil and petrochemical exports. Because the GCC nations rely on a single commodity traded at the international level they are concerned about both the economic and political issue areas at this level. Political issue outcomes included lobbying the UN with regard to resolutions on the Tanker War and the invasion of Kuwait. The organization showed an ability to negotiate and bargain effectively at this level in both issue areas. This was because the GCC saw their economic

resource threatened by regional conflicts and their most successful tool was diplomacy. The study shows the GCC were able to create “collective legitimization of their foreign policy actions,” and “international public policy” (Karns and Mingst 1987, 468-469) by focusing attention on issues important to their survival and the economic interests of western nations. Indeed, a review of the outcomes based on scales used to evaluate the GCC’s regional cooperation ability explain in more detail the importance of particular issue areas and levels of analysis.

Scale Results

Two scales were used to determine the GCC’s ability to achieve regional cooperation. The first scale analyzes level of success and evaluates the outcomes from the perspective of the GCC. The second scale level of diplomatic acts represents the level of political energy the GCC expends on issue area outcomes.

A broad review of the level of success scale results, shows the GCC achieved a 46.7% success or satisfaction level, but the neutral or further study category was a close second with 44.9% of the outcomes. The no success category was a distant third with 8.4% of the outcomes. This distribution of outcomes reflects the GCC as modestly successful on providing a forum for regional cooperation.

However the further study outcomes were within two percent of the success outcomes and reflects the GCC’s concern with national sovereignty particularly on outcomes at the domestic level where the largest category at this level was neutral or

further study with 50.8% of the outcomes. This result is because of the concern over national sovereignty issues so that any agreements or treaties the GCC agreed upon generally required further study to clarify points for implementation. This was the largest category for the level of success scale for all three issue areas at the domestic level. Therefore even with leadership support for the organization the domestic level witnessed constraints from internal factors.

At the regional level the largest category was success or satisfaction with 52.1% of the outcomes. This was the largest category for the security and political issue areas, whereas neutral or further study was the largest for the economic issue area. The findings show the GCC were therefore satisfied with its outcomes at the regional level and optimistic about their ability to promote regional cooperation.

At the international level the largest category was again success or satisfaction with 51.8% of the outcomes. Security and political issue areas had the largest number of outcomes in this category but the economic issue area had an equal number of outcomes in the success and further study categories. This latter result reflects the GCC's concern for economic issues at the international level.

With regard to the level of diplomatic acts, of the four categories for this scale, the largest number of outcomes were recorded in talks and meetings, with 61.1% of the outcomes. Therefore the majority of the GCC's outcomes occurred at organized talks or meetings. This reflects the GCC's procedural structure and also the organization's involvement in this type of diplomatic act for all issue areas and at all levels of analysis.

The second largest category was treaties and agreements with 21% of the outcomes. This can be explained by the agreements established by the GCC for its domestic level operations and also treaties and agreements the organization conducted at the regional and international level in specific issue areas. Verbal statements was third with 17% of the outcomes and aid or sanctions was a distant fourth with 0.9% of the outcomes.

Verbal statements was a close third category and as results by level of analysis will show findings for the regional and international level place this as the second category for political and security outcomes for this scale. As can be clearly noted the GCC did not expend more than a modest amount of political energy on outcomes and indeed aid and sanctions was ignored as a relevant category and level of political action.

General Conclusions

Limitations

As I stated in chapter 1, this is a single case study of the GCC as a regional organization consisting of small states. Because the existing literature is descriptive and historical, I built my own data set. One of the limitations of the study that should be noted is the way events were coded. Certain decisions were made in using events data analysis to record the GCC's issue interests for the study period. Because of the nature of the organization and its propensity toward meetings, results were disaggregated to gain greater insight into the issues that were tabled. This meant each issue discussed at a

meeting, press conference, or given in a verbal statement was coded. Therefore several results from one instance were recorded meaning several issue areas and levels could be utilized to give greater depth of understanding to the study. However, because of this, results at the meetings and talks level were larger than the other three categories for the level of diplomatic acts scale. It should be mentioned that each coded issue followed specific criteria and was categorized by a type of action such as signing of a treaty, a verbal expression of support or condemnation, or mention of another meeting. Also the result was recorded by level of success, i.e. whether the outcome was successful, not successful, or required further study.

As a result of the propensity of the GCC to hold meetings and talks and their concern with the domestic level and national sovereignty there was a larger number of results in the neutral, or further study category. This was because, although an outcome was expressed on an issue, it was quite often one that required further study at the ministerial or secretariat levels. These two points should be taken into consideration in future studies when attempting to disaggregate events to gain greater information for specific issue areas and levels.

Contributions

The study supports the theoretical underpinning of the existing literature which states that common external threats are behind the formation of regional alliances and

groupings. The study clearly establishes that external regional conflicts affected the GCC states and served as the catalyst for establishing the organization.

The results also demonstrate that security is not the only motivating factor, and that economic modernization and dependency on the international trading system are often overlooked. For example the organization was initially established as an economic entity. However, because of regional circumstances security became the primary consideration in order to achieve long and short-term economic development and political stability.

Another primary result of the study is increased awareness of many of the complexities facing developing nations in the current international climate. One of these complexities involves the place of national sovereignty, because it clashes with organizational attempts at regional cooperation. Although the GCC has been in existence for more than 14 years, these findings clearly indicate that it still struggles with the implications of organizational sovereignty. The GCC has had to allow its members greater national decision-making even after a decade and a half of establishment.

Though considerations of factors such as small national populations, military vulnerability, regime similarities, and dependency upon oil would compel one to conclude that the GCC member states would form a stronger organization, the fact of the matter is that considerations of national sovereignty stand in the way of greater regional cooperation. This is apparent in the economic issue area in the GCC's attempts to implement the first two stages of the Unified Economic Agreement by 2000. It is also apparent in the organization's attempts to implement the joint security agreement and the

military agreement. It is fair to say that attempts at regional cooperation were therefore generally modest despite strong support from the ministerial and supreme council levels of leadership.

In summary the GCC still has to face unresolved regional situations involving Iran and Iraq. The GCC has provided a level of security and military assistance, but these have probably reached their peak. It will still have to call on western nations to provide security if another conflict affects member states. In the economic area, the GCC has not promoted greater cooperation and development. The political has worked well at the regional level but greater cooperation is lagging at the domestic level among member nations. Unless the domestic level is worked on in some beneficial way, the GCC will probably not become any more effective in its goal of regional cooperation. The organization has existed for more than 14 years but the constraints of national sovereignty are affecting domestic level resources.

The study confirms to a certain extent, the reasons posited by several scholars on why nations might join such organizations. As the economic, security and political chapters amply indicate, the GCC demonstrated its understanding of the importance of appeasing larger and stronger nations in the immediate region. This is evidenced by the organization's use of diplomacy to achieve results in economic, security and political issue areas. In one sense the results confirm that "Small states do not challenge the status quo but rather are supportive of it - and try to cultivate the goodwill of the larger powers," (Papadakis and Starr 1987, 429). The GCC tried to appease Iran and Iraq portraying the

organization as an economic grouping ready to implement protectionist security measures and willing to use its diplomatic skills in mediation and negotiation talks.

But in another sense and on a more positive note the GCC has “achieved a degree of autonomy and influence as a political actor in its own right” (Pentland 1976, 14). It has implemented, to various degrees, three important agreements for the GCC; the Unified Economic Agreement, the military agreement, and the joint security agreement. It has also provided assistance and attempted to end some of the most complex political conflicts seen in the 1980s involving nations that were barely independent or sovereign states fifty years ago.

The future of the GCC depends on the leadership’s ability to manage domestic social and economic factors. Indeed, as the GCC enters a period that has no regional conflicts, but does have potential domestic problems in the form of budget deficits, an inability to increase economic development, and unfulfilled demands for popular participation, internal factors are important. While diplomatic and economic tools will provide the mechanism for the GCC’s role in regional cooperation the way forward will be in the domestic economic and political sector. Currently the northern Gulf countries are experiencing unrest by the Shi’a communities who are upset at being discriminated against in the workforce and in social services. Unrest in the Shi’a community in Bahrain has continued for almost two years because of the high unemployment rate, currently between 30 and 40%, lack of political representation, and declining social services. These issues need immediate attention by the government rather than blaming Iran for the dissension.

The national populations now consist of a greater number of educated younger people who want greater political representation and jobs. The governments have to reorient themselves to the needs of an increasing younger generation who will be more educated at a time when economic opportunities are slowly recovering or still developing after the Iran-Iraq war and the Kuwait conflict. The population increase in the younger generation puts pressure not only on economic opportunities, but also on housing and social services.

The GCC has to find ways to increase economic development through industrial projects, by attracting capital investment, and by allowing greater movement of their nationals so they can work in any member nation without restrictions. These factors need consideration because they will affect the future goals and direction of the organization.

Continued research of the GCC would assist in understanding the organization during a non-crisis period and also assist in advancing theoretical considerations of IGO and RIGO research with particular reference to developing nations. If, as some scholars suggest, these organizations are set to play a greater role on the international scene, a greater understanding of their behavior and abilities would be advantageous.

APPENDIX

GLOSSARY

BCOW	Behavioral Correlates of War project
CET	Common External Tarriff
EC	European Community
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
ICO	Islamic Conference Organization
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PDRY	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen)
PSF	Peninsula Shield Force
RIGO	Regional Intergovernmental Organization
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UEA	Unified Economic Agreement
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
USA	United States of America

TABLE A-I

GCC Summits and Head Nations

Summit	Year	Place and Head Nation for Summit/Year
1981	Abu Dhabi,	UAE
II	1981	Saudi Arabia
III	1982	Bahrain
IV	1983	Qatar
V	1984	Kuwait
VI	1985	Oman
VII	1986	UAE
VIII	1987	Saudi Arabia
IX	1988	Bahrain
X	1989	Oman
XI	1990	Qatar
XII	1991	Kuwait
XIII	1992	UAE
XIV	1993	Saudi Arabia
XV	1994	Bahrain

TABLE A-II

Level of Success for all Domestic Issue Areas

Success level	Economic	Security	Political	Total
success	59 39.1	91 44.2	100 38	250 40.3
neutral	80 53	98 47.6	137 52.1	315 50.8
no success	12 7.9	17 8.3	26 9.9	55 8.9
Total	151 24.4%	206 33.2%	263 42.4%	620 100%

TABLE A-III

Level of Success by Issue Area at the Regional Level

Success level	Economic	Security	Political	Total
success	7 30.4%	63 57.8%	177 51.8%	247 52.1%
neutral	9 39.1%	37 33.9%	140 40.9%	186 39.2%
no success	7 30.4%	9 8.3%	25 7.3%	41 8.6%
Total	23 4.9%	109 23%	342 72.2%	474 100%

TABLE A-IV

Level of Success for All Issue Areas at the International Level

Success level	Economic	Security	Political	Total
success	56 46.7%	23 60.5%	65 54.2%	144 51.8%
neutral	56 46.7%	13 34.2%	46 38.3%	115 41.4%
no success	8 6.7%	2 5.3%	9 7.5%	19 6.8%
Total	120 43.2%	38 13.7%	120 43.2%	278 100%

TABLE A-V

Level of Diplomatic Acts at Domestic Level for all Issue Areas

Diplomatic acts	Economic	Security	Political	Total
verbal	23	41	32	96
	15.2%	19.9%	12.2%	15.5%
talks	66	105	174	345
	43.7%	51%	66.2%	55.6%
treaty	60	60	57	177
	39.7%	29.1%	21.7%	28.5%
aid	2	0	0	2
	1.3%	0	0	0.3%
Total	151	206	263	620
	24.4%	33.2%	42.4%	100%

TABLE A-VI

Level of Diplomatic Acts at Regional Level for all Issue Areas

Diplomatic acts	Economic	Security	Political	Total
verbal	3	31	59	93
	13%	28.4%	17.3%	19.6%
talks	10	67	241	318
	43.5%	61.5%	70.5%	67.1%
treaty	6	10	41	57
	26.1%	9.2%	12%	12%
aid	4	1	1	6
	17.4%	0.9%	0.3%	1.3%
Total	23	109	342	474
	4.9%	23%	72.2%	100%

TABLE A-VII

Level of Diplomatic Acts at the International Level for all Issue Areas

Diplomatic acts	Economic	Security	Political	Total
verbal	15	11	19	45
	12.5%	28.9%	15.8%	16.2%
talks	70	19	86	175
	58.3%	50%	71.7%	62.9%
treaty	31	8	15	54
	25.8%	21.1%	12.5%	19.4%
aid	4	0	0	4
	3.3%	0	0	1.4%
Total	120	38	120	278
	43.2%	13.7%	43.2%	100%

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